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1 was --• this was after the fact that we found out 
2 that Duane Barney was in prison. 
3 Q. Again, referring back to the f95-f96 
4 time frame, did you believe that Mark Arnold was 
5 the lawyer for 4-D Development? 
6 A. Well, that thing that was written as 
7 4-D Development was never, in my mind, as ever 
8 being anything part of anything. I mean it 
9 wasn't -- I didnft think of that ever as being 
10 part of our new thing that was --
11 Q. Your Moab deal? 
12 A. Yeah. I don't know if Mark Arnold 
13 was or was not involved with them. 
14 Q. You just don't know one way or 
15 another? 
16 A. (Witness shakes head). 
17 Q. Okay. You've told me that you 
18 believe Arnold was the lawyer for the group; 
19 right? 
20 A. Uh-huh. 
21 Q, And the group, if I'm correct, is 
22 yourself and your husband, Page, Barney and 
23 Lanto? 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. Is that the group? 
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1 A- Right. 
2 Q. And that's the group Mark Arnold was 
3 representing? 
4 A. Right. 
5 Q. Was there anyone else in the group 
6 that Mark Arnold was representing? 
7 A. Not to my knowledge. It was never 
8 told us of those people. 
9 Q. Do you know if --
10 A. Are you talking individually now? 
11 Q. I'm talking about the group. 
12 A. Yeah. Well, he was -- that was the 
13 group that he -- right, that he represented. 
14 Q. He represented the group, and do you 
15 know if he represented Page, Barney or Lanto 
16 individually? 
17 A. No, I don't. 
18 Q. And he did not represent you 
19 individually? 
20 A. Never. 
21 Q. As far as Arnold's representation of 
22 the group, do you know who -- well, do you know 
23 whether any member of the group ever retained 
24 Arnold to be the lawyer for the group? 
25 A. I was never made privy to that 
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1 who knows what goes on, but we know what we 
2 have to pay for this, and we've been to banks 
3 and had loans and know how much we had to pay on 
4 points, and they told it all to us upfront. 
5 This was never told anything except 
6 that they were going to get the money and the 
7 loan was eminent and it was going to be a quick 
8 building and -- you know, so our hope was always 
9 in everything going. 
10 Q. Okay. Did -- was there one or 
11 more people, members of the group, whose 
12 responsibility it was to arrange to have a 
13 lawyer? 
14 A. Greg and Duane I imagine. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Don't imagine, just 
16 tell him what you know. 
17 A. I don't know. I don't know who would 
18 have been responsible. I assume the ones that ve 
19 gave the thing to. 
20 Q. When this joint venture was first 
21 formed, was it your understanding that each 
22 member had a different role? 
23 A. It was. 
24 Q. And do you agree with Bob that your 
25 role was to provide the property? 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. Your role was not to get financing? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q . Your role was not to hire a lawyer? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Your role was not to operate and 
7 manage the hotel? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Your role was not to construct the 
10 hotel? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. The only thing you were doing 
13 is donating the land; right? 
14 A. (Witness nods). 
15 Q. Okay. Now, is it true that Page was 
16 the person who was supposed to arrange for 
17 financing? 
18 A. I think so, because he was on the 
19 thing, he was going to get the financing. 
20 Q. Is it true that Barney was the one 
21 who was supposed to provide for the operation and 
22 management? 
23 A. Right, right. 
24 Q. And is it true that Lanto was going 
25 to be the person who constructed the hotel? 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. What, to your understanding, was Norm 
3 Larson's role? 
4 A. Well, at the beginning we didn't 
5 even know a Norm Larson, had no clue of who he 
6 was. When we got the paper back and there was 
7 a Norm Larson with a signature line that had not 
8 been signed is when we asked who this Norm Larson 
9 was, and then that's when -- well, he's going to 
10 help us, he's a rich man, and --
11 Q. The paper you're talking about with 
12 his signature, was that the promissory note? 
13 A. Right, and we didn't know at that 
14 point in time that he was the -- he was not even 
15 a principal. We had never been asked any of 
16 those things. 
17 Q. And who was it that you were 
18 talking to about Norm Larson, was that Page and 
19 Barney? 
20 A. Yeah, because that's who --
21 Q. Did you understand that Norm 
22 Larson - - o r that Page had asked Norm Larson to 
23 help provide or find a source of financing? 
24 A. After we got our loan from Guardian 
25 State and the president of the company came down 
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1 for us to sign the papers, and he, Joel Rush, the 
2 president of the bank, said that Norm Larson was 
3 really a rich, you know, financier type of 
4 thing, and that was our first ever real knowledge 
5 that -- I mean from a banker, you would take that 
6 this man knew, and Norm Larson said he was going 
7 to hire Joel Rush away from the bank to work for 
8 him. I mean that's when basically we started to 
9 know that, and that would be on the signature 
10 time of our Guardian State loan. 
11 Q. Was the Guardian State loan before 
12 you signed the note and deed of trust with 
13 respect to the Young loan? 
14 A. I don't know. I would have to look 
15 at the documents. 
16 Q. Did you expect that Page and Barney 
17 would be the ones that would communicate with 
18 the groupfs lawyer? 
19 A. Yes, and with the financial people 
2 0 and whoever. 
21 Q. Just for the moment let's focus on 
22 the lawyer, Mark Arnold, okay. 
23 Was it your expectation that whatever 
24 legal work needed to be done, Page and Barney 
25 would communicate that to Arnold on behalf of the 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 group? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And was it also your expectation 
4 that the communication would flow back the same 
5 way? 
6 A, Yes. 
7 Q. That is if Arnold is the group's 
8 lawyer and had information to communicate to the 
9 group, he would tell Page and Barney? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. That was your expectation? 
12 A. (Witness nods). 
13 Q. Is that a yes? 
14 A. Yes, yes. Sorry. 
15 Q. The court reporter can't see the 
16 nods. 
17 I know you mentioned this earlier, 
18 but I'm not sure I followed you. Do you know who 
19 Mark Mascaro is? 
20 A. I asked Steve just to brief up my 
21 brain, and he was the attorney who had contacted 
22 Mark to find out about Duane Barney. 
23 THE WITNESS: Right? 
2 4 BY MR. LALLI: 
25 Q. He can't testify. 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
RUSK 8c RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
A. And I think that open communication. 
2
 Q- Okay. 
3 A. 
4 
5 
6 
7 a 
8 
t 
ng 
and 
And if something is not o-o-ir, • ,_„ 
a ^ nuc going right, 
I think an attorney would say this i<5 „«*. 
J j.i>
 n o t a g O O C i 
thing or you need to do -- and he may
 h a v e b e e n 
doing that to Mark and -- or to the p e o p l e w h o 
re close to him every day. Thev liv^ . 
r J-A^ eci in Sal 
Lake, they got together every dav hh^ 
Yl
 u a ey fre havi 
9 a conversation every day at his offiPfl 
x
"
LACe
- Bob 
10 I weren't privy to that. 
11 Q. Well, and 1 think you just 
tQld me 
12 that it was your expectation that if t-u 
c n e
 group's 
13 attorney wanted to communicate with tv^ 
n e
 group, he 
14 would have done so t h r o u g h Page and Barn 
15 right? 
16 A. Yeah, he's not going to cal i 
-
1 a H of 
17 us to say --
18 Q. Right. And you think that«s 
19 reasonable? 
20 A. I t h i n k t h a t ' s r e a s o n a b l e
 a<3 
s a
 group 
21 a t t o r n e y . 
22 Q. So i t may have been t h e case th 
23 Mark A r n o l d was g i v i n g l o t s of communiCat. 
•^n t o 
24 Page and Ba rney and t h e y w e r e n ' t giving i t . 
25 you? 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
RUSK Sc RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
48 
1 Arnold wouldn't give us any information on these 
2 people. They could have been Mark Arnold himself 
3 with the money and using this as a front. By 
4 that time you're so suspicious of everything that 
5 everything seems dishonest. 
6 Q. By what time? 
7 A. By the time that we started finding 
8 out about this $160,000 note being due and trying 
9 to find out who -- well, from the time it came to 
10 the 160,000, when the papers came back and Bob 
11 wanted to know why it was 160,000 and why there 
12 was the interest and who was ~- why was Norm 
13 Larson on the paper, and all of these things 
14 began to make the whole thing suspect. 
15 Q. Okay. Well, let's start at the 
16 beginning and try and walk through it 
17 chronologically. 
18 A. Can we do a yes and no and you give 
19 me a good question? 
20 Q. Well, I'll try to do that. 
21 A. Okay, that will work. 
22 Q. Did Mark Arnold ever tell you that 
23 the loan was going to be for $40,000? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Did you talk to Mark Arnold before 
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1 you signed the promissory note and deed of 
2 trust? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Okay. Did Mark Arnold ever tell you 
5 anything about that loan from the Youngs before 
6 you signed the papers? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Okay. So any acts of dishonesty 
9 with respect to the $40,000 versus $160,000, 
10 that wasn't coming from Mark Arnold, was it? 
11 A. Well, he was the attorney. I assume 
12 he drew up the papers. 
13 Q. Okay. But he didn't tell you that 
14 the papers were $40,000? 
15 A. No, but Greg Page and Duane Barney 
16 told us that, and the paper that I saw was 
17 40,000. 
18 Q. Okay. But Mark Arnold, to your 
19 knowledge -- I mean if he did draft the papers, 
20 all he did was draft papers and put information 
21 in there that he had been given by Page and 
22 Barney. 
23 Is there any other possibility? 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Well, now you're asking 
25 her to speculate. So I'll object, and you 
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1 that -- that's not something that people kept 
2 from you? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. All right. And you knew that Arnold 
5 was Winkler's attorney before you ever sold the 
6 property to Winkler? 
7 A. That's true. 
8 Q. Is that true? 
9 A, Because that's how we found out that 
10 he was going to foreclose and that he had bought 
11 the paper, and he told us that he was one of Mark 
12 Arnold's clients, and this is what had happened 
13 and this is what had taken place. 
14 Q. Okay. And if Winkler --
15 A. We were never notified. 
16 Q. If Winkler hadn't bought the paper 
17 and then bought your property, your property 
18 probably would have been foreclosed on, wouldn't 
19 it? 
20 A. Well, I'm sure it probably would 
21 have. 
22 Q. And you would have gotten nothing out 
23 of the property? 
24 A. That's probably true. 
25 Q. Okay. And because of Winkler, you 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 didnft -- I mean you still feel like you lost 
2 money, but at least you got something; right? 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. So aren't you better off for Winkler 
5 having entered the picture than you would have 
6 been had he not? 
7 A. Well, I guess that thatfs probably 
8 true, but that still doesn't negate the fact 
9 that there were some underhanded things going 
10 on on this, 
11 Q. What did Arnold -- what did Arnold 
12 do that was underhanded with respect to bringing 
13 Winkler in? 
14 A. That part is not underhanded, to 
15 bring --
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. I mean we're talking about this type 
18 of stuff that --
19 Q. This, you're referring to the 
2 0 payments? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. And the fact that he had positioned 
24 himself to be a partner, according to this paper, 
25 this Pete Lanto position. I mean these are 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 Q. At the -- I want to go back to the 
2 $40,000 issue. 
3 Did anybody tell you that the loan 
4 was $4 0,000? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. So that's not something --
7 that 's not one of those things that they told Bob 
8 and then Bob told you? 
9 A. No, because they came up and got my 
10 signature at the water park. 
11 Q. And they was Page and Barney? 
12 A. (Witness nods). 
13 Q. Was Larson there at that time? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Do you remember if at the time Page 
16 and Barney had you sign the note and deed of 
17 trust, did they tell you what the interest rate 
18 would be? 
19 A. Not to my knowledge. It was supposed 
20 to be just a -- I don't even remember interest 
21 being a discussion, but it was supposed to be 
22 just a short period of time, we're not even 
23 talking 90 days like you mentioned earlier. 
24 Q. What did they tell you was the 
25 purpose of the loan? 
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1 A. The franchise for the Holiday Inn, 
2 and that that needed to be acquired before they 
3 could -- because they needed the two things, 
4 the franchise with the land to go to the bank 
5 to get the financing to get started right away. 
6 Q. Did they, and again, I'm referring 
7 to the time when Page and Barney came to get you 
8 to sign the note and deed of trust, did they 
9 tell you whether or not there would be points 
10 paid or loan fees? 
11 A. No, no. 
12 Q. Did you ask? 
13 A- No, because -- I just didn't ask. 
14 Q. When you signed the note and deed 
15 of trust, did you understand that you were 
16 pledging your land as collateral for a promissory 
17 note? 
18 A, Yes, for a short period of time. 
19 Q. Okay. And did you understand that 
20 if for some reason that note went into default, 
21 that the lenders could then foreclose on your 
22 land? 
23 A. Well, I -- that was an assumption, 
24 but --
25 Q. You didn't think that would happen? 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. But did you understand that -- I 
3 guess what I'm asking is --
4 A. Well, if you borrow money and you 
5 don't pay it back, somebody is going to 
6 foreclose. That's what happened with our land, 
7 so it's a given. 
8 Q. But did you understand that type of 
9 business transaction at the time? 
10 A. Did I understand the transaction? 
11 Q. Well, did you understand that if the 
12 loan went into default that the lender could take 
13 your property? 
14 A. Yeah, but for 40,000, I assumed 
15 that we could -- you know, even if it did for 
16 40,000, we could probably get some additional 
17 money or something, but when it came back the 
18 160, there was no way, and the 18 percent was 
19 just awful. 
20 Q. What did you do when you first 
21 found out that the loan was actually for 
22 160,000? 
23 A. Bob and I got into a real -- I mean 
24 I was very angry, I was really upset. 
25 Q. Did you say anything? 
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1 A. Bob called Greg, and he said not to 
2 worry, this is -- you know, and when youfve 
3 already committed, your name is on the dotted 
4 line, are you going to -- I don't know, it 
5 just --
6 Q. Did you go see an attorney? 
7 A. No, because we didn't even --
8 Q. Did you think at that time that you 
9 had been lied to? 
10 A. We knew we had been lied to, but we 
11 didn't seek an attorney, because Greg kept 
12 assuring us that this was still viable. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. But never did we know where all this 
15 money went. 
16 Q. Okay. Did you ever -- did you ever 
17 mention to Mark Arnold that Page and Barney had 
18 originally told you it would be $40,000? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. When did you tell that to Mark 
21 Arnold? 
22 A. Well, I'm sure that over time that i 
23 was not only told, but when we -- even when we 
24 went to this meeting it was the subject of 
25 discussion. 
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2 Q. And --
3 A. Everything was always just 
4 soft-soaped as being this is a fine thing. 
5 Q. Mark Arnold, in fact, did go to the 
6 Youngs and persuade them to extend? 
7 A. Yes, he did. 
8 Q. In fact, he did that more than once, 
9 did he not? 
10 A. Well, I don't know. The first time 
11 didn't he pay it? 
12 Q . I don't know. 
13 A. I don't know. One of the times he 
14 said he would pay it, he would handle it, he and 
15 Greg would handle it, and then I'm sure that he 
16 got an extension, but we never knew, because we 
17 never had -- we never knew what was really going 
18 on with the money until that time. 
19 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to 
20 stop? 
21 MR. RUSSELL: No, go ahead. 
22 BY MR. LALLI: 
23 Q, When the money was received from the 
24 Young loan, the 160,000, did you know at that 
25 time who was keeping the money? 
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1 Arnold who bought Lanto's interest, I mean it 
2 wasn't his money? 
3 A. No, but he wanted the interest part. 
4 MR. RUSSELL: That would make it 
5 worse if he used their money to buy himself 
6 an interest. 
7 MR. LALLI: Well --
8 MR. RUSSELL: That makes it worse. 
9 A. I don't know how --
10 Q. Okay. Did you ever consent to Mark 
11 Arnold --
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Let me finish my question. Did you 
14 ever consent to Mark Arnold becoming a partner? 
15 A. Never. 
16 Q. Okay. Did you ever consent to Mark 
17 Arnold purchasing Lanto's interest? 
18 A. Never. 
19 Q. Okay. Have you ever heard Mark 
20 Arnold assert an ownership interest in your 
21 joint venture? 
22 A. Only after we went up for this 
23 meeting and he said that he had bought out Pete 
24 Lanto's interest to be a partner in the Moab 
25 land development. 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
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1 any of the other individuals? 
2 A. Oh, I had no idea of that, 
3 Q. Okay. So you don't know one way or 
4 the other whether he was the lawyer for Norman 
5 Larson as an individual? 
6 A. No, I don't know. 
7 Q. Okay. And same questions with 
8 respect to Page and Barney, do you know whether 
9 or not Mark Arnold was the lawyer for Page or 
10 Barney individually? 
11 A. No, I don't know that. 
12 Q. Okay. You believed that Arnold was 
13 just the lawyer for the entire group? 
14 A. That's right. That's the only 
15 contact I had, was -- my involvement with the 
16 group was pushing to accomplish what we were 
17 out to do. 
18 Q. Did you believe that Mark Arnold was 
19 your lawyer personally as opposed to the lawyer 
20 for the group? 
21 A. Since he was part of the group, 
22 lawyer for the group, that's - - h e was taking 
23 care of us. 
24 Q. Of the group? 
25 A. Of the group, yeah, of our group. 
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1 Q. In the event that your interests 
2 became different from say Page or Barney, did 
3 you believe that Arnold would then represent 
4 your interests rather than Page or Barney's? 
5 A, No, I was just -- as the group is the 
6 only thing, 
7 Q- Okay. Did you even think about 
8 that? 
9 A. Did I think about it? 
10 Q. Did you think about whether Mr. 
11 Arnold would look out for your interests rather 
12 than Page or Barney's in the event your interests 
13 became different from Page's and Barney's? 
14 A. I don't think it would be singled 
15 out -- that I would be singled out as being shown 
16 any favor, it was strictly for the group, that's 
17 it. 
18 Q. When you say the group, you've 
19 identified for me the individuals to the group. 
20 Is that group different in your mind 
21 from the entity known as 4-D Development? 
22 A. I don't know anything about 4-D 
23 Development. 
24 Q. You're familiar with that company 
2 5 now, are you not? 
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1 wait for the next question. 
2 THE WITNESS: All right. 
3 BY MR.. LALLI: 
4 Q. Did you ever object to Mark Arnold 
5 being the lawyer for the group? 
6 A. No, sir. 
7 Q. Was that okay with you? 
8 A. Sure. 
9 Q. Did you ever ask any of the other 
10 members of the group, or Arnold himself, how 
11 Arnold would be paid for being the lawyer for 
12 the group? 
13 A. No, I didn't. 
14 Q. Do you know if Arnold ever was paid 
15 for being the lawyer for the group? 
16 A. I don't -- didn't -- I assumed that 
17 the amount of money that was collected, that he 
18 certainly was -- had his share of that, whatever 
19 his -- I didn't see any statement from Arnold or 
20 anything like that, or from anybody, just that 
21 the total amount of money, it was represented 
22 that he was in control of it. 
23 Q. When you say the money that was 
24 received, are you talking about the $160,000? 
25 A. That's right. 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: Bob, listen to the 
2 question and answer the question. 
3 THE WITNESS: All right. 
4 MR. RUSSELL: If you don't understand 
5 the question, say that, otherwise the 
6 assumption is that you understand the 
7 question. 
8 A. All right, go ahead again, ask it. 
9 Q. Let me start back at the beginning. 
10 Do you know whether the group ever 
11 paid Mark Arnold any money for being the lawyer 
12 for the group? 
13 A. I don't know that, no. 
14 Q. Did you believe that Mark Arnold 
15 would be paid for providing legal services to 
16 the group? 
17 A. I assumed. 
18 Q. Did that thought even occur to you at 
19 the time? 
20 A. No, sir. 
21 Q. Never thought, gee, Mark Arnold is 
22 the lawyer for the group, we're going to have to 
23 pay him something? 
24 A. I never -- the disposition of the 
25 funds was never my concern, because I was never 
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1 Q. Well, within the group, isn't it 
2 true that each member had different 
3 responsibilities? 
4 A. I assume that, but I -- the main 
5 contacts I had was with Duane Barney and Greg 
6 Page, and primarily Greg Page was the principal 
7 individual that was giving me answers when he was 
8 available to give answers. 
9 Q. And wasn't Greg Page's primary 
10 responsibility to get financing for the project? 
11 A. I can't single out him as being the 
12 one that's responsible for the financing when the 
13 whole group was involved, they each had jobs to 
14 do, but Greg Page was my principal contact. 
15 Q. Okay. I'll get back to that in a 
16 minute. 
17 A. All right. 
18 Q. Do you know what legal services 
19 Arnold provided to the group? 
20 A. If you call the raising -- getting 
21 the money from the Youngs, I understand he was 
22 the principal behind that, it was his contact, 
23 to obtain the money and make arrangements with 
2 4 Ann Young. 
25 Q. Okay. And at the time - - a t the time 
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Do you remember the 
Yeah. 
The question was did 
1 of it, he was taking care of it, and not for me 
2 to worry about it at all. 
3 MR. RUSSELL: Do you remember what 
4 the question was? 
5 THE WITNESS: Beg your pardon? 
6 MR. RUSSELL: 
7 question? 
8 THE WITNESS: 
9 MR. RUSSELL: 
10 you ever talk to Mark Arnold about legal 
11 issues. 
12 A. No, I assume that's a legal issue, 
13 he's an attorney. 
14 Q. Was there one member of the group 
15 whose responsibility it was to interact with Mark 
16 Arnold? 
17 A. Greg Page I would say would be the 
18 lead individual that we would try to get ahold 
19 of. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 A. And Duane Barney. 
22 Q. And during this period of the 
23 intended development, was it your understanding 
24 that Page and Barney were Mark Arnold's contacts 
25 with the group? 
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2 Q. And did you have any objection to 
3 that? 
4 A. I couldn't object, I had no 
5 objection at that point. 
6 Q. Did you have any expectation that 
7 Arnold would communicate with you rather than 
8 Page or Barney? 
9 A, When I couldn't get ahold of Greg 
10 Page like I was -- I mentioned having gotten 
11 ahold of Arnold, but I started with Greg Page 
12 and Duane Barney, and then communications just 
13 gradually -- it was very difficult to get 
14 ahold of anybody, finally impossible to get 
15 ahold of Duane Barney, and found out we had --
16 we had to do some extra checking to find out 
17 where he was. 
18 Q. Okay. Well, let me back up a step. 
19 A, All right. 
20 Q* You've told me that you believed 
21 Mark Arnold was the lawyer for the group; 
22 right? 
23 A, That's right. 
24 Q. And you've told me that you believed 
25 that Greg Page and Duane Barney were the people 
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1 A. No, sir. 
2 Q. And, in fact, it's true, isn't it, 
3 that you trusted Page and Barney to take care of 
4 a lot of the details? 
5 A. And Mr. Arnold, sure. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. The whole group, all the others. 
8 Q. What -- and let's try to limit this 
9 specifically to Arnold. 
10 What did you believe Arnold's duties 
11 were? 
12 A. Was what? 
13 Q. What did you believe were Arnold's 
14 duties, what was he supposed to be doing? 
15 A. He represented himself as having the 
16 contact with Ann Young and raising the money. I 
17 relayed this information to Mr. Page, and I get 
18 this straight from -- secondhand from Mr. Page, 
19 not directly from Mr. Arnold. 
20 Q. Okay. Other than raising money, did 
21 you believe Arnold had any other duties? 
22 A. He had a title company, he owned a 
23 title company. 
24 Q. And how did that affect the joint 
25 venture? 
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1 to help obtain financing? 
2 A. I'm sorry? 
3 Q. Did you understand he was trying to 
4 help get financing? 
5 A, I don't know what his position was. 
6 Q. Did you ever ask? 
7 A. I never got -- I asked, yes, sir. 
8 Q- Who did you ask? 
9 A. Greg Page. 
10 Q. And what did he tell you? 
11 A. He was one of the essential partners 
12 in the group. 
13 Q. Did Page tell you what Larson was 
14 supposed to be doing? 
15 A. I never did get an answer on that. 
16 Q. I mean was it Page didn't answer your 
17 question at all or he just didn't give you an 
18 answer you understood? 
19 A. That's -- he didn't give me an answer 
20 that I understood, that would be the way to put 
21 it. 
22 Q. When you say that Arnold was the 
23 lawyer for the group, did you believe that he was 
24 the lawyer for the group for the entire period of 
25 time? 
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1 A. I would say so, because the Young 
2 situation, that was tied in there right at the 
3 beginning. 
4 Q. And didn't there come a point in 
5 time, within a few months before you.sold the 
6 land to Winkler, where you contacted another 
7 attorney? 
8 A. Yes, sir. 
9 Q. And that was Mr. McConkey? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. And you also were contacting another 
12 advisor by the name of Michael Hughes; correct? 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
14 Q. And was Michael Hughes providing you 
15 legal advice? 
16 A. He sure gave me encouragement, yes, 
17 sir. 
18 Q. What kind of encouragement? 
19 A. Well, encouragement that something 
20 is wrong here that they don't want to communicate 
21 with you, that you have difficulty in getting 
22 ahold of anybody, and nobody would give me answer 
23 answer. At that point he would give us an answer 
24 where -- Greg Page wouldn't answer the phone, . 
25 nobody would answer the phones, and so we had to 
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1 get to the bottom of it, and found out -- the 
2 only thing we found out after McConkey was 
3 checking, this Mark Arnold had gotten this call 
4 from this lawyer, and Mr. Arnold said -- said 
5 that Mr. Barney was serving his time in the 
6 federal pen. 
7 So I guess thatfs the extent of what 
8 we really learned, accomplished out of this, but 
9 hiring another lawyer and putting out that kind 
10 of money was just something that we just had to 
11 make a decision to cut that off, we just couldn't 
12 keep on going with this thing. 
13 Q. Did you pay Mr. McConkey any money? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. Do you recall how much? 
16 A. Oh, a couple of thousand dollars I 
17 would guess. 
18 Q. Did you ever enter into a written 
19 agreement with Mr. McConkey that governed your 
20 relationship with him? 
21 A. Verbal. We had a limit, we had a 
22 limit, and I said at this point we're going to 
23 have to -- $2,000 was the cutoff point. I didrLft 
24 want to -- and then he -- that was the extent of 
25 it. 
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1 Q. Would you say that you hired Mr. 
2 McConkey to be your lawyer? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. And when you're talking about your 
5 lawyer, are you talking about Bob Norman 
6 personally or a lawyer for the group? 
7 A. No, personally, to find out why we 
8 weren't getting any answers from the group. 
9 Q. Okay, And up to that time it was 
10 your understanding that Mark Arnold was the 
11 lawyer for the group and not for Bob Norman 
12 personally; is that true? 
13 A. That's right. 
14 Q. Do you know Mark Mascaro? 
15 A. No, sir. 
16 Q. Ever heard that name? 
17 A. I don't believe so. 
18 THE WITNESS: Have you heard of it 
19 anybody? I haven't heard of it. 
2 0 BY MR. LALLI: 
21 Q. I just saw -- I saw his name on some 
22 documents. 
23 A. Oh, no, sir, I can't recall. 
24 Q. With respect to the Young loan, you 
25 signed a note and deed of trust to obtain that 
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1 Young loan, didnft you? 
2 A. Yes, sir. 
3 Q. And I think I understood from your 
4 previous testimony that you thought you were 
5 signing a note for $40,000 rather than 160,000? 
6 A. That's what they had told us. 
7 Q, Who told you that? 
8 A. Well, Greg Page and Duane Barney. 
9 Q. Okay. Did Mark Arnold ever tell you 
10 that it was for $40,000? 
11 A. Well, he had not gotten -- had not 
12 been down here at that point. 
13 Q. Okay. Did you ever have any 
14 conversations with Mark Arnold about the Young 
15 loan? 
16 MR. RUSSELL: Ever? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 Q. Before it was made, I mean before you 
19 actually signed the documents? 
2 0 A. Oh, no. 
21 Q. Okay. So you talked to Arnold after 
22 you had signed the documents? 
23 A. Thatfs right, upon Greg Page's 
24 recommendation to call, go ahead and call him 
25 directly. 
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1 A. No, sir, I never --
2 Q. You didn't understand that? 
3 A. No, sir. 
4 Q. Did there come a point in time when 
5 you learned? 
6 A, Oh, yeah, when I got the paperwork I 
7 looked at it and read the details and what all 
8 the language said, sure. 
9 Q. So is it your belief that Page and 
10 Barney lied to you? 
11 A, Yes, sir. 
12 Q. Is it your belief that Mark Arnold 
13 lied to you? 
14 A. I don't --
15 Q. And you hadn't even talked to Arnold 
16 at that point; right? 
17 A. I hadn't even talked to Arnold. 
18 Q. So he couldn't have lied to you; 
19 right? 
20 A. Well, all I have is he was involved 
21 in the thing, in the paperwork, he was 
22 representing the group, he's the -- at the time 
23 of signing, they didn't go into that detail, but 
24 later on --
25 Q. But regardless, Arnold, you had never 
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1 even talked to him at the time you signed the 
2 documents; right? 
3 A. That's right. 
4 Q. And, in fact, at the time you got 
5 the copy back from Page, you still hadn't talked 
6 to Arnold, had you? 
7 A- I don't think so at that point. 
8 Q. Did you know where the $160,000 was 
9 being kept? 
10 A. I -- no, I had no idea. 
11 Q. Okay. Did you ask anybody? 
12 A, I never did ask, I just assumed that 
13 I was -- that they were representing the thing, 
14 and the answers we had, that they're pursuing 
15 the Holiday Inn reality, which was our main 
16 obj ective. 
17 Q. Did you rely on Page and Barney to 
18 safeguard the money? 
19 A. I had to at that point. 
20 Q. Well, that was their responsibility 
21 under the joint venture, wasn't it? 
22 A. To handle that money? 
23 Q. Yes. 
24 A. Well, I just had to assume that that 
25 was their responsibility. 
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1 problem, but this, I believe, is the accounting 
2 that Norm Larson gave your wife and son when they 
3 went up to Salt Lake? 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. Can you see that document well enough 
6 to recognize it? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. Okay. I just want to ask you 
9 about -- well, when the joint venture obtained 
10 the $160,000 loan, did you understand what that 
11 money was to be used for? 
12 A. No, sir. 
13 Q. Did you ever ask? 
14 A. No, sir. 
15 Q. Did you just assume that that was 
16 your -- the other people's responsibility? 
17 A. That's right. 
18 Q. Do you believe that it was somehow 
19 wrong for them to use the money to pay points on 
20 the loan? 
21 A. For them to what? 
22 Q. Pay points. 
23 A. I never thought about it. 
24 Q. Never thought about it one way or the 
25 other? 
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1 A, Not that I know of. 
2 Q. And you -- when the $160,000 loan 
3 was made, did you understand that that money 
4 was short-term financing to give the group enough 
5 money to where they could go out and get 
6 long-term financing? 
7 A, That was my understanding. 
8 Q. So you understood that there were 
9 reasons why we needed -- or why the group needed 
10 the short-term $160,000 loan; right? 
11 A. I finally understood it. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. They needed that money, but --
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. But I didn't agree with it. 
16 Q. Well, according to Norm Larson's 
17 accounting, a lot of that money went to pay 
18 interest to the Youngs. 
19 Is that your understanding? 
20 A. I can't -- I haven't gone over these 
2 1 numbers. 
22 Q. Okay. Well, you know, maybe your 
23 attorney needs to help here, but it looks to me 
24 like there's a payment to Ann Young on June 21 
25 for $3,200. 
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1 A. No, sir. 
2 Q. You're not aware of that. Did 
3 Page or Barney ever tell you that they were 
4 looking at a similar Holiday Inn project in 
5 Park City? 
6 A. No, sir. 
7 Q. Did you ever have any conversations 
8 with Mark Arnold about a Holiday Inn project in 
9 Park City? 
10 A. No, sir. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Can we take a couple o 
12 minutes? 
13 MR. LALLI: Sure. 
14 (Off the record). 
15 BY MR. LALLI: 
16 Q. If you look at your first amended 
17 complaint, there's an exhibit that's attached to 
18 the back of that. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Flip to the back, it's 
20 the Arnold. 
21 BY MR. LALLI: 
22 Q. This is a 1-page purchase agreement 
23 where Pete Lanto is selling his interest. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Can you read that? 
25 A. Okay, he's selling his interest. 
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1 Q. Yes. And the document says that ths 
2 purchasers are Mark Arnold and Western Empire 
3 Advisors? 
4 A. Uh-huh. 
5 Q. Do you know what Western Empire 
6 Advisors is? 
7 A. No, sir. 
8 Q. The date of this is October 27, 
9 1995. 
10 At that time, were you aware that 
11 Lanto was selling his interest? 
12 A. No, sir. 
13 Q. Do you know what interest was 
14 sold? 
15 A. No, sir. 
16 Q. Have you ever seen this document 
17 before? 
18 A. No, sir. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: Well, up until today. 
2 0 BY MR. LALLI: 
21 Q. Have you ever seen that before 
22 today? 
23 A. No, not before today. I see it now. 
24 Q. Okay. At any time did you become 
25 aware that Lanto was selling his interest? 
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1 A. No one told me, no, sir. 
2 Q. Did anyone ever tell you that Mark 
3 Arnold had purchased an interest in the joint 
4 venture? 
5 A. No, sir. 
6 Q. And did you ever become aware of 
7 that? 
8 A. I was aware of it at the time he was 
9 giving his deposition here. 
10 Q. Before he gave his deposition, did 
11 you ever hear about Mark Arnold purchasing an 
12 interest in the joint venture? 
13 A. No, sir. 
14 Q. And I take it from that that you 
15 never approved that? 
16 A. That I didn't hear about it, that I 
17 don't approve? 
18 Q. Well, no, let me ask a better 
19 question. 
20 To your knowledge, did Mark Arnold 
21 ever become a member of the joint venture 
22 group? 
23 A. Our joint venture group, he was a 
24 member of it, yes. I just --
25 Q. Well, I want to draw a distinction 
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1 A. That was our original plan. 
2 Q. Okay. And so the question is, did 
3 Mark Arnold ever become an owner of some 
4 percentage in either the motel part or the back 
5 part? 
6 A. I don't know. 
7 Q. Okay. You never gave your consent 
8 for Mark Arnold to become an owner in the hotel 
9 part? 
10 A. Nobody asked me about that. 
11 Q. Okay. So because nobody asked you, 
12 you therefore never consented; right? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. How were you introduced to Jim 
15 Winkler? 
16 A. He was -- he just came up to the 
17 water park, he was visiting, I believe, with Mark 
18 Arnold. 
19 Q. And as we've already talked about, 
20 Mr. Winkler ended up buying your property, didn't 
21 he? 
22 A. Right. 
23 Q. And that was the same property that 
24 had been pledged as collateral for the Young 
25 loan; is that true? 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
RUSK 8c RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
7 2 
1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. Now, isn't it also true that if 
3 Mr. Winkler had not purchased that, that the 
4 Youngs would have foreclosed on your property? 
5 A. That's what I was told. 
6 Q. Did you view the Winkler purchase as 
7 a good thing or a bad thing? 
8 A. I have mixed emotions about it, but 
9 better than nothing, because the interest rate 
10 was going on, and it doesn't take any knowledge, 
11 special knowledge, to know that 18 percent on 
12 the money is -- would eat itself up. The value 
13 of the land keeps -- is going up, but the 
14 interest is definitely a fixed fee that we need 
15 to get rid of, and so you have to have -- he had 
16 taken over the Youngs' position, and he had 
17 called and told us that he had taken that 
18 position over, and that the Youngs were going to 
19 foreclose. 
20 Q. Did you at some point have a 
21 closing on the sale of your property to Mr. 
22 Winkler? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. And was that at a title company 
25 office or something? 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. And at that time did the title 
3 company give you a settlement statement? 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. And the settlement statement showed 
6 that the value of the property -- or the sales 
7 price was 420,000. 
8 Is that your recollection? 
9 A. Yes, sir, I think it was 60,000 an 
10 acre. 
11 Q. And how many acres were there? 
12 A. Five and something. I've forgotten. 
13 I have to -- I don't recall the exact acreage. 
14 Q. Okay. Well, let me --
15 A. On the tract. 
16 Q. The deal -- I mean wasn't your deal 
17 with Winkler that he would, in effect, pay off 
18 the Young loan and then pay you some additional 
19 money? 
20 A. No, sir, he had already made the --
21 he had already -- Mr. Arnold had indicated that 
22 the Youngs were foreclosing, and so Winkler came 
23 in and took that position over. 
24 Q. Okay. And then in addition to doing 
25 that, he also paid you some money for the land, 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
RUSK 8c RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
970-242-3074 
1 you had adequate sewer and water facilities; 
2 correct? 
3 A. Okay. 
4 Q. Okay. What I'm wondering is if the 
5 was anybody like Page or Barney, or even Mark 
6 Arnold, who ever told you look, what you think 
7 adequate for sewer and water is not, and 
8 therefore we need to get some additional water 
9 and sewer rights from the City of Moab or the 
10 county or some other government entity? 
11 A. No, sir. 
12 Q. Nobody ever told you that? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Do you have a belief about why the 
15 Holiday Inn project never got developed? 
16 What went wrong? 
17 A. I think the inability of the group 
18 be able to put it together properly. I don't 
19 know why. 
20 Q. Do you know if they ever got 
21 financing? 
22 A. Who? 
23 Q. The people you were relying on to g 
24 financing. 
25 A. I didn't pursue that with the group 
Joppa H. Smith, RPR 
RUSK Sc RUSK COURT REPORTERS 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
Tab 3 
CERTIFIED COP\ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Deposition of: 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and 
DIANE NORMAN, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE 
R. BARNEY, PETER LANTOS, 
ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE and 
NORMAN M. LARSON, 
Defendants . 
oooOooo 
Deposition of ROBERT NORMAN, SR., taken at the 
instance and request of the Defendant Norman M. 
Larson, at 150 East Center Street, Moab, Utah, on 
the 25th day of August 1999, at the hour of 10:30 
a.m., before David A. Thacker, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter, Utah 
License No. 22-105417-7 8 01 and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah. 
oooOooo 
R 
A S S O C I A T E D P R O F F S S I O N A L R I: P O R T H R S , L. C 
28 
A. No. I don't recall. 
Q. Did they tell you at the time this 
agreement was signed, what that expertise and 
consideration was going to be? 
A. No. I'm sorry, I didn't get that 
information. 
Q. Will you turn with me to the front page of 
the document, please. Looking down at paragraph 1.7 
there on the bottom, additional joint venturers. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you had a chance it read that? 
A. Additional joint venturers may, that's all 
I can see. 
MR. RUSSELL: Says, "Additional joint 
venturers may be added to the joint venture at any 
time upon agreement of all of the then-existing 
joint venturers." 
THE WITNESS: That's right. I see that. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recall reading that 
provision when you entered into this agreement? 
A. I'm sure I read it, but I don't recall the 
details of that. 
Q. Did you ever give your consent for any 
other individual to become a member of the joint 
venture agreement? 
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A. They never asked me. 
Q. So is your answer no? 
A. Yes. No. The answer is no. 
Q. Thank you. 
(Exhibit No. 14 marked. ) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what's been 
marked as Exhibit 14. I'll ask you if you recognize 
that document? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. I'll represent to you that this was 
produced as part of your document production in 
response to Norman Larsen's request, and that you 
produced the document. You say you don't recognize 
the document? 
A. No. 
Q. There at the bottom references a 
development of the balance of 5.3 acres which 
includes the water well. Is that the larger portion 
that you had referenced earlier? 
A. That's right. Yes. 
Q. Was that to entail a development of the 
water well? 
A. Well, we didn't talk about development. We 
didn't talk about any development. 
Q. Okay. 
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1 would have received on this date. It appears to be 
2 I December 6, 1995. And if you look with me, let's 
3 J look at the exhibit of the check. The facsimile 
4 J indication appears to be December 6, f95, from SF&C 
5 J Company. Do you recall what that entity is? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Could it be Senior Financing Company? 
8 1 A . I don ' t know. 
9 I Q. Do these pages, though, appear to be froir 
10 the facsimile that you received that were discussed 
11 in the letter of December 7, 1995? 
12 A. I assume so. I'm not sure. 
13 Q. Let's look first then at the check that's 
14 numbered BN24. Did Mr. Page tell you anything about 
15 this check on or about the time that he sent you e, 
16 J copy by facsimile? 
17 A. No, he didn't explain it. I just looked at 
18 I face value, I see the date of the check and that 
19 J this was Mr. Larson had the franchise. 
20 J Q. You understood it at this time around 
21 December 6, 1995, that Mr. Larson had the franchise? 
22 A. Well, just by looking at the check. I 
23 didn't know until then. 
24 Q. Did you, after having seen a copy of this 
25 check, discuss it with anyone? 
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Arnold that one situation. That's it. 
Q. Anything else you can recall about--in that 
time period that we discussed? 
A. No. That's it, as far as I know. 
(Exhibit No. 34 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) I've handed you what's been 
marked as Exhibit 34. Ask you to look at it. 
MR. RUSSELL: This is a closing statement 
on your transaction with Mr. Winkler. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recognize this 
document? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let's look down at line 204, says a credit 
for payoff from Norman, looks like $212,000. What 
does that represent? 
A. Accrued interest I assume. 
Q. What was that a payment of? 
A. Read what it says here. 
MR. RUSSELL: Says credit for a payoff from 
Norman, $212,000. 
THE WITNESS: That was the interest that he 
subtracted from the total payment. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) It's a payoff of a debt? 
A. Payoff of the interest rate. The interest 
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rate. The interest on the money that was due him, 
based on his assuming the Youngs1 position. 
Q. So it represents the interest on that pJus 
the principal balance of that amount? 
A. Yeah. The interest. Yeah. The interest 
payment. 
Q. So as a result of this transaction, that 
amount was paid off? 
A. Yeah. He was generous. He didn't charge 
18 percent. It was something like 12 something 
percent. He did that out of his own volition. 
Q. When he assumed the note he changed the 
interest rate, 12 percent? 
A. When we finalized this thing, he gave us a 
break and charged less interest. Eighteen percent 
would have eaten the whole thing up practically, you 
know. Eighteen percent is real hard money. 
(Exhibit No. 35 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what has been 
marked as Exhibit No. 35, 
MR. RUSSELL: This is entitled a full 
reconveyance, referring to a Deed of Trust executed 
by Robert and Diane Norman, beneficiary Ann Young 
and Norman Young, with a legal description. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recognize that 
Tab 4 
SOUTH EASTERN UTAH TITLE COMPANY 
150 East 1st North 
PO Box 700 
Moab, Utah 
435 259 7635 
B Type° fL°a n 
1 [ J FHA 2 [ ] FmHA 3 [ ] Conv Unins 
1 4 M VA 5 [ 1 Conv Ins 
6 File Number 
50.480 G 
7 Loan Number 8 Mortgage Ins Case Number 
C Note This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown 
hems marked "(PO c Y Z?cpaid outside the closing, thev are shown here for information/ purposes and are not include3 in the totals 
D Name and Address of Buyer 
JAMES W WINKLER 
2700 NORTH US HIGHWAY 40 
HEBER. UTAH 84032 
E Name and Address of Seller 
ROBERT R NORMAN 
A DIANE NORMAN 
P O BOX 1300 
MOAB, UTAH 84532 
F Name and Address of Lender 
G Property Location 
T25S, R21E, SECTION 26. A PORTION 
H Settlement Agent 
South Eastern Utah Title Company 
Place of Settlement 150 East 1st North 
Moab, Utah 
Settlement Date 
5/22/98 
J Summary of Buyer's Transaction 
100, Gross Amount Due from Buyer j 
101 Contract sales price 
102 Personal Property 1 
103 Settlement charges (line 1400) ! 
| 104 1 
105 
H Adjustments for Items paid by seller In advance 1 ,06 
107 County taxes 5/23/98 to 12/31/98 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
J 120 Gross Amount Due From Buyer 
200 Amounts Paid By Or In Behalf of Buyer 
201 Deposit or earnest money 
' 202 Principal amount of new loan 
j 203 Existing loan liken subiect to 
' 204 CREDIT FOR PAYOrr TROM NORMAN 
205 
206 
207 
j 208 
209 
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller 
210 
211 County taxes to 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 Total Paid By/For Buyer 
300 Cash At Settlement From/To Buyer 
301 Gross Amt due from buyer (line 120) 
302 Gross Amt od by/for buyer (line 220) 
303 Cash (X] From [ ] To Buyer 
K 
420.000 00 ! 
87 j 
648 40 
420,735 40 
212000 00 
212 000 00 
420.735 40 
212.000 00 
208.735 40 
Summary of Seller's Transaction 
400 Gross Amount Due To Seller 
121 Contract sales price 
402 Personal Property 
403 ___._ 
404 
405 
Adjustments for Items paid by seller La advance 
406 
407 County taxes to 
408 
409 
410 
411 
412 
420 Gross Amount Due to Seller 
500 Reduction In Amount Due to Seller 
501 Excess deposit 
502 Settlement Charges to Seller (line 1400) 
503 Existing loan taken subject to 
504 Payoff of first mortgage loan winker 
505 Payoff of second mortgage loan 
506 Payoff Linda Bohannon on adiacent property 
507 
508 
509 
Adiustmeuts of items unpaid by seller 
510 
511 County taxes 1/1/98 to 5/22/98 
512 Delmqunet 1996 taxes 
513 1997 taxes 
514 
515 
! 516 
5«? 
1 518 
519 
520 Total Reduction Amount Due to Seller 
600 Cash At Settlement from/To Seller 
1 601 Gross Amt due to seller (line 420) 
602 Less reduction in amt due seller 
603- Cash [X] To [ 1 From Seller 
420.000 00 
420 000 00 1 
380 
212000 00 
38.229 25 1 
412 88 
1.125 99 
949 52 J 
253 097 64 j 
420.000 00~| 
253.097 64 |j 
166.902 36 
>l r reviewed tfx HUD-1 UaUmtct Suttmt* tad to IIK bet* of my knowledge 
.1 J u v ^ W i l v t d t copy of «h« HUO-I S < U U O K M SUttoKot 
M UU( k U 4 «n* *nd . e c u * . * tiMtmt* of til ,«c<ipu u d dufcirKaxnU *«<fc om m, accou* <x fry m< <a (Mi U « u « u o « I fc«hc< €t<u(r 
A^u ^alvtoVVQAA^^^ BN0099 
Page 2 
L. ScAlemenl Charges 
700 Total Sales/Broker's Commission Based on price S @ % s 
Division of Commission (line 700) as follows 
701 $ 
702 $ 
703 Commission paid at Settlement 
704 
800 Items Payable In Connection WUh Loan 
801 Loan Origination Fee % to 
802 Loan Discount 
803 Appraisal Fee to 
804 Credit Report to 
80S Lender's Inspection Fee to 
806 Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to 
807 
808 
809 
310 
811 
900 Items Required by Lender To Be Paid In Advance 
901 Interest from to (3),$ /day 
902 Mortgage Insurance Premium to 
903 Hazard insurance Premium to 
904 
Paid From 
Borrowers 
Funds at 
Settlement 
Paid From 
Sellers 
Funds at 
Settlement 
905 
1000 Reserves Deposited With Lender 
1001 Hazard insurance months (5>,$ per month 
1002 Mortgage insurance months (5}$ per month 
1003 
1004 County property taxes months (5jS per month 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 Aggregate Accounting Adjustment 
1100 Title Charges 
1101 Settlement or closing fee to South Eastern Utah Title Company 75 00 75 00 
1102 
1103 
1104 
1105 
1106 Document Preparation to South Eastern Utah Title Co 25 00 
1107 
1108 Title Insurance to South Eastern Utah Title Company 200 00 
1109 Lenders coverage S 
1110 Owner's coverage $10,000 00 MINIMUM PCR INSTRUCTIONS FROM BUYER 
1111 
1112 
1113 
1200 Government Recording and Transfer Charges 
1201 Recording Fees Deed $ 12 00,Rclcascs$80 00 12 00 80 00 
1202 
1203 
1204 
1205 
1300 Additional Settlement Charges 
1301 Survey to 
1302 Pest inspection to 
1303 
1304 
1305 
J'fOQ, Total Settlement Charges . S7.W mm i H^y c^tfbUjr ror^cwed 4>< HUO-1 S<t«Jon«>< Suicmcrt M 4 to 4 « b a t o( m» knowledge *n4 bdlcf tl U • ttv« v4 tccui*i< tUlcniciK o(til i cedpa and 4iibunctn<oU ««d« <M •» / account or mf ra< U Ihu fe«iu«cuo<i I (unhCT c«\«fy 
« I t « v < r e c < N ^ « copy of th< HUD-1 Settlement St J t 
|i&WWMLE ^ timmfi^^ Ci&fj^z^<^ 
Seller K DIANE NORMAN 
~hc JIUD 1 Settlement Statcrnent which I llavc prepared is \ true and accurate account of this transaction I have caused or will cause the funds to 
e disbursed in accordance with this statembnr \ / / fl / y s 
SetVrcmenl Agent ~~~ 
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Arnold that one situation. That's it. 
Q. Anything else you can recall about--in that 
time period that we discussed? 
A. No. That's it, as far as I know. 
(Exhibit No. 34 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) I've handed you what's been 
marked as Exhibit 34. Ask you to look at it. 
MR. RUSSELL: This is a closing statement 
on your transaction with Mr. Winkler. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recognize this 
document? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let's look down at line 204, says a credit 
for payoff from Norman, looks like $212,000. What 
does that represent? 
A. Accrued interest I assume. 
Q. What was that a payment of? 
A. Read what it says here. 
MR. RUSSELL: Says credit for a payoff from 
Norman, $212,000. 
THE WITNESS: That was the interest that he 
subtracted from the total payment. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) It's a payoff of a debt? 
A. Payoff of the interest rate. The interest 
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rate. The interest on the money that was due him, 
based on his assuming the Youngs1 position. 
Q. So it represents the interest on that plus 
the principal balance of that amount? 
A. Yeah. The interest. Yeah. The interest 
payment. 
Q. So as a result of this transaction, that 
amount was paid off? 
A. Yeah. He was generous. He didn't charge 
18 percent. It was something like 12 something 
percent. He did that out of his own volition. 
Q. When he assumed the note he changed the 
interest rate, 12 percent? 
A. When we finalized this thing, he gave us a 
break and charged less interest. Eighteen percent 
would have eaten the whole thing up practically, you 
know. Eighteen percent is real hard money. 
(Exhibit No. 35 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what has been 
marked as Exhibit No. 35. 
MR. RUSSELL: This is entitled a full 
reconveyance, referring to a Deed of Trust executed 
by Robert and Diane Norman, beneficiary Ann Young 
and Norman Young, with a legal description. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recognize that 
Tab 5 
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AUGUST 28, 2000 
THE COURT: Good morning. We've got a full 
courtroom today. I know that some of you were here last 
week, right, and I'm sorry about that. It's not supposed 
to happen that you get summoned to trials, two weeks in a 
row, but I guess we've been working our jury list pretty 
hard this half of this year, and so that meant that some of 
you got two summonses, and it happened to be two summonses 
in a row. I will report to you that we're working on a 
law. We're going to be proposing a law to the legislation 
that will change that and make it so you can only be 
summoned for one jury trial during each six-month period, 
whether you actually serve on the jury or not. And if 
you're actually summoned to court, that you then are exempt 
from jury service for two years after that. As the law 
stands right now, you have to actually serve on the jury to 
be exempt from jury service. So if there are any of you 
who have served on a jury in the past two years, raise your 
hand now and I'll excuse you. 
You are drawn to our jury list because you are 
registered to vote in Grand County, or because you have a 
driver's license with a Grand County address. And then we 
sent you a questionnaire, which you should have filled out 
and returned indicating that you meet the requirements. 
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But I'm going to go over those requirements with you to 
make sure that you still meet them, or that you actually do 
meet them: You have to be at least 18 years old; you must 
be a resident of Grand County; you must be a citizen of the 
United States; you must be able to read, speak, and 
understand English; and you could not have been convicted 
of a felony that has not been expunged. Are there any of 
you who do not meet those requirements? 
Okay, well, we have a trial this week in the case 
of Robert Norman, Sr. and Diane Norman against Mark Arnold 
and Norman Larson. And this case, the only thing I can 
promise you for sure is that it will finish by the end of 
the week. It may be sooner than that, but Ifve just been 
visiting with the lawyers about the case and it may take 
all week to try this case. It's a civil dispute. It 
involves a disagreement between these two sides as to the 
consequences of some actions. There's nothing criminal 
that's alleged on either side, but it's a civil dispute 
about who has what obligation to whom. And I'll let the 
lawyers explain exactly what it involves to you later on 
before we start the trial. Right now we just need to 
select a jury. And sometime I hope before we break for 
lunch today we will have selected eight of you to serve on 
the jury, and the rest of you are going to be free to go. 
For right now I am going to ask the clerk to call 
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the names of 16 of you selected at random to come forward 
and take a seat in the jury box. When your name is called, 
please come forward. We want to fill up the back row 
beginning with that seat in the corner first, then the 
front row of the jury box, and then these four seats 
outside of the jury box. The clerk will now call your 
names. 
THE CLERK: Thomas Michael Stangl, Michael Hank 
Johnston, Kevin Brian Meagan, Douglas G. Farnsworth, Henry 
Daisy, Jr., Kimberly Ray Jones, Donna L. Randall, Shantella 
Williams, Yvette D. Hass, Sandra Esham, Beverly Florence 
Holmberg, Laura N. Northrup. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not present. 
THE COURT: Ms. Northrup is absent. 
THE CLERK: Leroy F. Lopez, Robert G. Williams, 
Timothy M. Hillyard, Steven Grundy, Michael Steven Johnson. 
THE COURT: Okay, that's 16 of you. The rest of 
you hang on, you may get a chance to take one of these hot 
seats in a minute. What we're going to do now is ask you 
some questions to find out whether there's some reason why 
you could not be impartial and unbiased towards both sides 
in this case. And in order to determine that, we need to 
find out something in general about your background, and 
then some specific questions that relate to this case and 
your experiences that may have some effect on how you'd 
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look at this case. You1re not on trial, we're not trying 
to pry into your personal lives, but we're trying to 
balance between the right of these parties to have an 
impartial jury, and your right to privacy. And so we're 
going to ask you some questions designed to find out 
whether there may be something that would create a bias in 
your mind. 
And after I have determined that there are at 
least 14 of you who are qualified to try this particular 
case, that you can be fair and impartial, then each of the 
sides in this case is going to be permitted to excuse three 
of you for a total of — three plus three is six, and 
leaving us with eight people to try the case. 
Now, I don't expect to be asking you a lot of 
personal questions, but it may be that I'll ask you 
something that you don't want to answer in front of 
everyone. If that happens, please indicate that you'd like 
to speak with me privately, and we don't have to speak --
we can speak right here, I'll turn off the microphone, we 
can just visit briefly here, or we can go back into my 
office if you'd like to go back there to visit. It is 
important that you answer the questions, because if we get 
to the end of the trial and we've reached a decision and it 
turns out that one of the jurors did not answer one of the 
questions truthfully, that can upset everything that's been 
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done for a whole week, and we end up having to try the case 
all over again. So please be candid in your responses to 
these questions. 
First of all, I need to get some basic background 
information from each of you. I need to know what area of 
the county you live in, how long you've lived in the 
county, the limits of your formal education, that is how 
many years of school you completed, and if you specialized 
or got a degree, what kind of a degree you got, or what 
kind of special training you received. What kind of work 
you do, if you retired what kind of work you retired from, 
and what kind of work your spouse does if you are married. 
And if your spouse is retired, what kind of work the spouse 
retired from. I'll help you remember these if you can't 
remember everything, but this is the kind of basic 
background information we need to have, and then we'll get 
onto some specific questions that relate to this case. 
Mr. Stangl, we'll start with you. What part of 
the county do you live in? 
MR. STANGL: Spanish Valley. 
THE COURT: How long have you lived in Grand 
County? 
MR. STANGL: Ten years (inaudible). 
THE COURT: How many years of school did you 
complete? 
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Light. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
STANGL: Twelve. 
COURT: What kind of work do 
STANGL: I work full-time for 
(Inaudible) journeyman, meterman. 
a side welding business. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Are you married? 
STANGL: Yes. 
COURT: Your wife's work? 
STANGL: She works for Arches 
COURT: Okay. Sometimes tell 
somebody works for is pretty descriptive of 
but I want to 
tell us 
then we 
inquire 
where 
might, 
make sure you understand, you 
you do? 
Utah Power and 
And I also have 
National Park. 
ing me who 
what they do, 
don't have to 
you work, just what kind of work 
in some specific cases we ma 
further than that. Mr. Johnston. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
JOHNSTON: I live in the city 
COURT: How many years in the 
JOHNSTON: Fifteen. 
COURT: Your education? 
JOHNSTON: High school. 
COURT: What kind of work do 
JOHNSTON: I work at Canyonla 
Park, construction. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: And your wife? 
you do. And 
y have to J 
• 
county? 1 
you 
nds 
do? 
National J 
JOHNSTON: She works for (inaudible). 
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(inaudi 
Packard 
okay. 
(inaudi 
college 
termina 
but she 
THE 
MR. 
ble) . 
Ranch 
THE 
COURT: 
MEAGAN: 
If m an 
COURT: 
Mr. Meagan. 
Twenty-five years. I live in 
elect .rician. And I (inaudible) 
Packard Ranch is a resort, right, 
Mr. Farnsworth. 
MR. FARNSWORTH: Forty-five years. I live 
ble) by the old Sim's Farm. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Your 
FARNSWORTH: 
COURT: Did 
FARNSWORTH: 
(inaudible). 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Oka^ 
FARNSWORTH: 
COURT: What 
FARNSWORTH: 
1 for Buckeye 
THE 
MR. 
works 
THE 
COURT: 
Gas. 
And 
FARNSWORTH: 
COURT: You 
I was thinking of sending 
Mr. Daisy. 
MR. DAISY: Ten 
• education? 
Fourteen years. 
you specialize after high t 
I graduated from a junior 
And your employment? 
Ifm retired. 
up on 
school? 
did you do before you retired? 
I managed an underground storage 
your wife? 
She keeps the house (inaudible), J 
just barely saved yourself 
a copy of the tape to your 
years (inaudible). 
there. 
wife. J 
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THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
for (inaudible). 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
MS. JONES: 
in the city. I have 
I!m a bookkeeper and 
Your education? 
Eleventh grade. 
What kind of work do you do? 
I work — heavy equipment operator 
And your wife, if you're married. 
She works for (inaudible) office. 
Thank you. Ms. Jones. 
I've lived here for 35 years. I live 
two years of college, just general ed. 
computer operator at a local auto 1 
parts store. My husband works as a maintenance man for the 
National Park Service 
THE COURT: 
MS. RANDALL 
(inaudible) cleaning 
works at Maverik and 
THE COURT: 
MS. RANDALL 
THE COURT: 
MR. WILDEN: 
years or more. 
THE COURT: 
MR. WILDEN: 
THE COURT: 
I 
Thank you. Ms. Randall. I 
: Ifm a homemaker of 32 years. And 
lady, I have three jobs. My husband 
(inaudible). 1 
Do you live in Moab? J 
: Yeah, in the city. 1 
Okay. Mr. Wilden. J 
I'm retired. I've lived here 20 
Education? I 
Ten years. I 
What kind of work did you retire J 
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from? 
MR. 
engineers. 
THE 
MR. 
WILDEN 
COURT: 
WILDEN 
chemo treatments. 
THE 
MS. 
lived here 33 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
HASS: 
years. 
COURT: 
HASS: 
COURT: 
HASS: 
And my husband works 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
HASS: 
COURT: 
ESHAM: 
COURT: 
ESHAM: 
I'm retired from the 
: I retired from the operating 
Are you married? 
: Yes. My wife's in Provo taking 
Okay. Ms. Hass. 
I live out in Spanish Valley. I've 
Education? 
Pardon me? 
Education? 
Eleventh grade. I'm a stay-home mom. 
in the film industry. 1 
Works where? 1 
Film industry. 1 
Okay. Ms. Esham. 
I live in the county, West Moab. 
Okay. 1 
And I was born and raised in Moab. 
National Park Service, but I am now 
the office manager at (inaudible). And I completed two 
years of business college. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
ESHAM: 
Are you married? 1 
I'm a widow. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Holmberg. 
MS. HOLMBERG: I live in the city. Been here 
about seven years. ; ['m at the (inaudible), medical 
assistant. Ifm a waitress. And my husband is an 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: 
MR. LOPEZ: 
I work maintenance. 
office equipment. 
THE COURT: 
MR. LOPEZ: 
military. 
THE COURT: 
military? 
MR. LOPEZ: 
(inaudible) aircraft 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Lopez. 
I live in the city, about 12 years. 
My wife's (inaudible) manager at 
Your education? 
Twelve years, and three years 
What kind of work did you do in the 
I worked on an aircraft carrier, J 
on (inaudible). 1 
Okay, thank you. Mr. Williams. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I've lived here for 11 years. J 
Education is 14 years majoring in geological sciences. I'm 
currently an automotive technician for the local dealership 
here specializing in 
in Spanish Valley. 
THE COURT: 
Hillyard. 
electronics. I'm single, and I live 
Thank you, Mr. Williams. Mr. 1 
MR. HILLYARD: I've lived in the city for 38 
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years. I work at the golf course in maintenance. My 
wifefs dead. I have a high school education. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hillyard. Mr. Grundy. 
MR. GRUNDY: I've been here four years. I live 
in the city. I'm a high school graduate. I'm a laborer 
and a flagger for Legrand Johnson. 
THE COURT: Are you married? 
MR. GRUNDY: No, single. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grundy. Mr. Johnson. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. I've been here about three 
and a half years. I have a master's degree (inaudible). 
Single. (Inaudible) animal science and business. 
THE COURT: So we have a Michael Johnston and a 
Michael Johnson on this panel. All right. I need to tell 
you a little bit about this case, and tell you who the 
parties are that are involved in this case. The plaintiffs 
are Robert Norman, Sr. and Diane Norman, and they're seated 
over here at this table with their attorney Steve Russell. 
Mr. Russell is the one in the dark suit. Are any of you 
related by blood or marriage to either Robert or Diane 
Norman as far as you know? 
All right. The defendants are seated at this 
table over here. And they're the two men at that end of 
the table. The one furthest over is Norman Larson, and 
seated next to him is Mark Arnold. Are any of you related 
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by blood or marriage to either of these people? Okay. 
This dispute involves a disagreement over what — 
well, some — there was a joint venture to develop some 
property here in Moab, I think, of Mr. Norman's, and these 
people were involved in some ways with that. I don't want 
to tell you too much about it, because a lot of what I 
might tell you would be disputed. But the hotel wasn't 
developed, the property didn't get developed the way it was 
hoped, and there's some money that Mr. Norman has had to 
pay, and he's asking that these, that Mr. Arnold and Mr. 
Larson be responsible with him for that. And that's what 
the dispute is about, who has to pay this money that's 
owing. And that's what the jury will have to decide once 
we've selected a jury in this case. 
Now, are there any of you who have heard anything 
about this dispute from talking to anybody, from reading in 
the paper, from watching TV, or listening to the radio, or 
heard anybody mentioning anything about this? 
Mr. Williams, I don't want you to tell me what 
you've heard, but tell me who you heard it from. 
MR. WILLIAMS: We have an association which I 
belong to, Back Country Horsemen, Southeastern Utah, and we 
were talking about this at a local meeting one time and 
wondering if we were going to lose access to part of that 
area for riding horses. 
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THE COURT: Okay. So your association had some 
concern about what would happen if there was development in 
that property? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 
THE COURT: But did you actually talk about this 
dispute between these people who were involved in this 
joint venture? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Just in a general form. 
THE COURT: Did anyone purport to know what the 
inside story was then? Okay. All right, have any of 
you -- I take it since none of you have heard anything, 
except Mr. Williams tangentially, that you havenft formed 
any opinion as to who's right or wrong in this dispute, if 
you haven't heard anything about it; is that true? 
Okay, I need to find out, letfs see, Counsel, 
have you given me a list of the witnesses who will be 
testifying in 
of witnesses? 
MR. 
may be easier 
THE 
this case? Mr. Russell, do you have a list 
RUSSELL: We have filed designations, but it 
just for me to say, Your Honor. 
COURT: Okay. Why don't you tell me who 
those witnesses will be. 
MR. RUSSELL: Norman's witnesses will be the 
Normans themselves; a man by the name of Jim Winkler, who 
lives in Heber, Utah; Joe Kingsley, who is a local realtor; 
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Michael Hughes who lives in Salt Lake City, up Emigration 
Canyon; possibly the 
And that's all. 
THE 
witnesses be? 
MR. 
COURT: 
LALLI: 
defendants, but you'll hear from them. 
All right. Mr. Lalli, who will your 
I think in addition to the people Mr. 
Russell's mentioned we would probably call a gentleman by 
the 
who 
was 
and 
who 
name of Steve Nelson, who is a real estate appraiser 
lives in Provo; and Greg Page, who is a gentleman who 
involved . Ln this 
possibly another 
situation, he lives in Salt Lake City; 
fellow by the name of Duane Barney, 
also lives in Salt Lake City, who was involved 
(inaudible). 
THE 
trailer court 
MR. 
THE 
trailer --
Mr. 
COURT: Is Mr. Barney the one who has the 
here in — 
LALLI: 
COURT: 
I don't believe so. 
There is a Barney who owns a 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Craig Barney. 
THE 
Lalli? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
LALLI: 
COURT: 
Oh, Craig Barney, okay. Anyone else, 
I think that's all, Your Honor. 
Okay. And Mr. Haskins? 
HASKINS: Your Honor, we wouldn't call anyone 
other than the defendant and those people who have already 
LI XT' 7\ T> U T7» r> M n r m n 
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been named. 
THE COURT: Okay. I need, youfve heard the names 
of these witnesses and something about them that may enable 
you to figure out whether you would be likely to know them. 
I need to find out if any of you have a close business, 
personal, or family relationship with any of these people. 
You work with them often enough, or visit them socially 
often enough, or have a family relationship that's close 
enough you think we probably ought to know about, any of 
you have that kind of relationship with any of these 
people, the Normans, Jim Winkler, Joe Kingsley, Michael 
Hughes, Steve Nelson, Greg Page, Duane Barney, Norman 
Larson, or Mark Arnold, any of you? 
Okay, now I have tangentially introduced you to 
Mr. Haskins, he's representing Norman Larson. He just 
stood up. Matthew Lalli is seated next to him, he 
represents Mark Arnold. And with him is his associate, and 
your name, ma'am, is. 
MS. SORENSEN: Amy Sorensen. 
THE COURT: Amy Sorensen. Do any of you have a 
close business, personal, or family relationship with any 
of those people? How about with Steve Russell, any of you? 
All right, Mr. Hillyard, tell me what your relationship is 
with Mr. Russell. 
MR. HILLYARD: I work at the golf course, and he 
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comes out and plays. We've played several times together. 
(Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Is your relationship with him 
close enough that -- how many times have you played golf 
with him total then? 
MR. HILLYARD: I have no idea. 
THE COURT: Is it so many that you've lost count? 
MR. HILLYARD: (Inaudible) it's several 
occasions. I don't know the number. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is he your favorite golf 
partner? 
MR. HILLYARD: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: If you lost him — 
MR. HILLYARD: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just trying to find out 
whether you're going to feel some pressure in this case to 
look at things his way, because you'd might worry that he'd 
stop coming to the golf course, or that you'd lose a golf 
partner. 
MR. HILLYARD: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Beg your pardon? 
MR. HILLYARD: I said, there's a possibility, but 
I!m not sure. 
THE COURT: Well, if you would be influenced by 
that relationship I need to know. If you think — there's 
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no shame in that, if you think you'd be influenced by that 
relationship, I need to know that. 
MR. HILLYARD: There's a possibility, sir, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, well, I think I'm 
going to excuse you then, Mr. Hillyard. Thank you. I 
better — well, we've got still one more extra, so I don't 
need to replace him yet. Are there any of you who owe 
money to any of these people who are seated at these 
tables? Do any of them owe you money? Do you rent 
property to any of them, or do they rent property to you? 
Have you worked for any of them? Mr. Stangl. 
MR. STANGL: I did some welding for Bob Norman, 
I'm guessing five or six years ago. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did he pay you? 
MR. STANGL: Yes. 
THE COURT: So the transaction's over with? 
MR. STANGL: Oh, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Was it such a terrible or such 
a good experience that it would influence you to this day, 
and you'd feel obligated to feel a strong sense that you 
need to agree with him in this case today? 
MR. STANGL: No. 
THE COURT: You realize he could be right or 
wrong about what he's asserting, right? Are you willing to 
look at this case impartially without regard to that 
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previous relationship 
MR. 
THE 
MS. 
STANGL: 
COURT: 
HASS: 1 
that you had with him? 
Yes. 
Okay. Anyone else? Ms. Hass. 
lie hauled water for Mr. Norman when we 
had our trucking company. 
about 
things 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: 
HASS: 
COURT: 
that experience 
his wa; 
MS. 
THE 
How long ago was that? 
Probably four or five years ago. 
Was there anything so impressive 
that you'd feel inclined to look at 
/, or not look at things his way? 
HASS: ] 
COURT: 
Mo. 
So you can disregard that and deci 
this case based on evidence you hear in the courtroom? 
Okay. 
mean, 
do, do 
talked 
Ms. Randall. 
MS. 
I just i 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
RANDALL : I work with (inaudible) for, I 
say hi to Mrs. Norman. 
COURT: 
RANDALL 
COURT: 
RANDALL 
COURT: 
you know? 
MS. 
to her 
THE 
RANDALL 
a littl< 
COURT: 
Does she also work there? 
: Yeah. 
What kind of work do you do? 
: I'm a housekeeper. 
Okay. And what kind of work does 
: Nurse's aid. I've just said hi 
e bit. 
Okay. Would you feel comfortable 
de 
she 
and 
U T7 7\ T* UT7 r> T J U T m n 
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sitting on the jury in this case, and deciding whether her 
position is right or wrong in this case, and not worrying 
about whether she'd wouldn't say hi to you the next time 
she sees you at the hospital? 
MS. RANDALL: I think so. 
THE COURT: So you can be impartial to both sides 
in this case? And if the evidence fails to convince you 
that Ms. Norman is right, can you find for the other party 
without any concern for your — for what business 
relationship you do have? 
MS. RANDALL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anyone else? Have 
any of the lawyers represented you or someone in a matter 
against you? All right, Mr. Russell would you like me to 
put any additional questions to this panel? 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible), Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Haskins, would you 
like me to put any additional questions to this panel? 
MR. HASKINS: If I could approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HASKINS: I'd like to know if anyone attends 
church with these people. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do any of you attend the same 
congregation for religious worship with the Normans as far 
as you know? All right. Any other questions, Mr. Haskins? 
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MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
experience in 
HASKINS: That1 s all I have. 
COURT: Mr. Lalli, any additional questions? 
RUSSELL: May I 
COURT: Yes. 
LALLI: We'd li 
development of 
approach? 
ke to know if they have any 
real estate or purchasing or 
selling real estate other than their homes, and also if 
they have any 
(inaudible). 
THE 
experience, I 
similar respons 
COURT: Okay. 
know that there 
have bought and sold your own 
ibilities regarding 
Do any of you have any 
would be a lot of you who 1 
homes, but other than buying 
and selling your own homes, are there any of you who have 
had any experience in develop 
Do any of you have any civic 
of land use, like being on th 
involved with 
ing real estate in this area? 
responsibilities in the area I 
e planning commission or being 
helping to draft a zoning ordinance, or J 
sitting on a board of adjustment, something like that? Mr. 1 
Johnson. 
MR. 
helped put on, 
programming I 
JOHNSON: Well, 
, part of my job 
put on seminars 
other types of situations. I 
buying and selling land and -
THE COURT: You're 
not exactly that, but I've J 
is through educational J 
on ag land preservation and 1 
also help teach classes on J 
the extension agent, okay. So 1 
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1 part of your job involves teaching farmers and ranchers 
2 J about buying and selling; is that right? 
3 I MR. JOHNSON: In theory they can come to me and 
4 talk to me. Usually I111 turn them over to somebody that 
5 works more closely with that, but usually my role is more 
6 I the educational not the legal aspects. Although, that's 
7 brought up in most of our seminars. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. All right, any other questions 
9 that any of you would like to put to this panel? Mr. 
10 Russell, do you pass the panel for cause? 
11 MR. RUSSELL: I do, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Haskins? 
13 MR. HASKINS: I do, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Lalli? 
15 MR. LALLI: Yes, I do. 
16 THE COURT: All right. The clerk will now give a 
17 list to ihe bailiff, take it to Mr. Russell, and Mr. 
18 Russell you can exercise your first preemptory challenge. 
19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This is easier than I 
20 thought itfd be. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. I had quite a few additional 
22 I jurors thinking that we'd need more. 
23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: I was supposed to put you under oath 
25 before you answer these questions, so now what Ifm going to 
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do is put you 
is the truth. 
anything 
it wasn't 
any way? 
to Norman 
did. 
building 
was alive 
'70s. 
that 
under oath to tell me 
So before I put you \ 
you to 
exactly ri 
AL1 right. 
Id me that wasn 
ght or that you 
what you just told me 
mder oath, is there 
't the truth, because if 
'd like to clarify in 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
ESHAM: 
All right, Ms . Esham. 
When my husband was alive we did go 
's home a few times. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: 
ESHAM: 
COURT: 
as you, how 
MS. 
THE 
ESHAM: 
COURT: 
, how long 
MS. 
THE 
ESHAM: 
COURT: 
Okay. 
And also (inaudible) same building I 
Mr. Norman worked in the same 
long ago? 
Probably back 
In the '60s. 
ago was that? 
I don't know, 
In the '70s. 
with Normans in their home? 
to their 
MS. 
THE 
ESHAM: 
COURT: 
home? 
MS. ESHAM: 
We definitely 
in the '60s. 
And when your husband J 
but it's maybe in the 
You may have visited 
went there. 
How many times do you think you went 
Probably a couple. 
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THE COURT: Couple of times. Would that 
influence you? 
MS. ESHAM: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Do you think you can be fair for both 
sides and without regard to the fact that you've been in 
the Normans' home and you once worked in the same office as 
Mr. Norman? Can you be fair for both sides? Can you be 
fair for both sides? 
MS. ESHAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Randall. 
MS. RANDALL: My daughter-in-law had Steve 
Russell for a lawyer for my granddaughter. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would that influence you? 
MS. RANDALL: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to have you — oh, 
Mr. Farnsworth. 
MR. FARNSWORTH: Yeah. I wanted to clarify it up 
(inaudible) real estate what your question is, I have sold 
some real estate in the Grand Canyon. 
THE COURT: Okay. But it was not, you didn't 
develop it to sell it, but you just — 
MR. FARNSWORTH: No, I didn't develop to sell 
it, some of the people that bought it are developing it 
Southern Grand, San Juan County. 
THE COURT: So you've sold some, was it 
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residential real estate, or I guess maybe --
ranch? 
amounts o 
you weren 
land use ] 
and those 
money the 
of you to 
if youfd 
swear or 
questions 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
FARNSWORTH: Some of it was. 
COURT: Some of it was commercial, 
FARNSWORTH: Yes. 
or was it 
COURT: Okay. So you have sold some large 
f real estate, more than just one lot f 
MR. 
THE 
FARNSWORTH: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. All right. But you 
or a home? 
didn't — 
ft the one that was actually involved with the 
planning, and getting approval for a subdivision, 
kinds of things? 
MR. FARNSWORTH: No, I just took what 
y gave me, and it stopped right there. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going 
swear that what you said to me is the 
raise i your right hand, please. Do all 
affirm that the answers youfve given to 
have 
THE 
THE 
x been the truth? 
JURORS: Yes. 
COURT: All right, thank you. Now 
to give the list to Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell wi 
one challenge, 
challenge 
exercised 
then the defendants will jointly 
back and forth until all six challenge 
. Mr ". Johnson, Mr. Michael Johnson, I 
amount of 
to ask all 
truth. So 
of you 
my I 
Ifm going 
11 exercise 
exercise a 1 
s have been 
guess, is 
U I T 7 \ r P U I T , D T\7UT«T>TP r » / ^ r* ty \ 7 
27 
going to, he's going to be excused, so don't exercise a 
challenge with respect to him. I'm going to excuse him 
because he's extra. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, number 16? 
THE COURT: Yes. Number 16, he's going to be 
excused. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just draw a line through 
that? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, right now for those of 
you seated out here, things look pretty good for you. If 
you didn't want to be on the jury, things look pretty good 
for you. But sometimes things happen at this stage, so 
don't leave quite yet. If you wanted to be on the jury, 
your chances are pretty slim right now. I think the 
bailiff's already checked to see who's here, right? 
THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for being 
here. You need to wait just in case we lose somebody 
before we get the jury selected, but you don't have to sit 
in the jury box anymore. I want to make sure that all of 
you realize you're going to get paid for being here today. 
It's not a lot of money, $18,50, but if you just stay here 
for an hour or so it's not bad pay. If you're selected to 
be on the jury, your pay is exactly the same for the first 
day, but on the second day they kick your pay up to $4 9. 
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That's not a lot of money. If you've got a complaint about 
that, talk to the legislature, they set the amount. But 
the state of Utah spends -- I was looking at the figures 
just last week, I don't know whether it's half a million or 
a million dollars every year on fees for jurors. And it's 
not much money for you, but I think there's about 45 of you 
that are here today, and that is, if you consider 18.50 
times 45, that's $832.50, that's quite a bit of money being 
paid for the first day of a trial. On the second day it 
will actually go down, even though we pay more for the 
second day, because it will be just eight times 49. So 
it's a lot of money to the state, it's not much money for 
you. And I hope it's a sacrifice that each of you are able 
to make without too much damage to your family economics. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that a half a million 
in this county here, or statewide? 
THE COURT: Statewide. Half a million is the 
amount that we're short from previous years. We're 
overdrawn on the state bank to that amount. Of course, the 
state has surpluses in other areas, so that the state 
itself is not overdrawn. But the legislature consistently 
fails to appropriate sufficient money for jury fees. They 
just say, well, we'll do it someday. 
MR. HASKINS: Your honor, we disagree over the 
third preemptory challenge (inaudible) with regard to 
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(inaudi 
one of 
bring s 
I flip a 
okay wi 
one and 
number. 
way the 
already 
ble) . 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
HASKINS 
COURT: 
them exercise 1 
omebody back. 
coin, or they < 
You can fli p a coin or I 
: Okay. All right. 
Unless you 
the one they 
So I think 
want to agree 
will. 
to let each 
r
 want, then we'll have to 
if they can't 
^an flip a coin. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
th you' p 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
THE 
ten? 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Do you want 
(Inaudible), 
That's okay. 
(Inaudible). 
(Inaudible). 
agree, 
right. 
I can 
Which is 
to pick a number between 
I'm thinking of a number. Just * 
LALLI: 
HASKINS 
COURT: 
RUSSELL 
COURT: 
Five. 
: Six. 
It's six, so you get to 1 
: Which one 
Mr. Haskins 
challenges were exercised 
, Counsel? 
MR. RUSSELL : No, Your 
was it, Your 
tell me what 
take yours. J 
Honor? 
Any problems with 
that haven't 
Honor. 
the 
been noted 
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MR. HASKINS: I'm sorry, Your Honor, what was the 
question? 
THE COURT: Any problem with the way the 
challenges were exercised? 
MR. HASKINS: Well, for the record I object to 
the fact that we're not necessarily (inaudible) to the 
point where we can't have three preemptories per defendant. 
But we'll put that in the record later. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASKINS: All right. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Lalli? 
MR. LALLI: Nothing other than what Mr. Haskins 
indicates. 
THE COURT: Okay. The clerk will now read the 
names of those who will serve on the jury. Those of you 
whose names are read, please don't leave. 
THE CLERK: Michael Hank Johnston, Kevin Brian 
Meagan, Henry Daisy, Jr., Kimberly Ray Jones, Yvette D. 
Hass, Beverly Florence Holmberg, Leroy F. Lopez, Steven 
Grundy. 
THE COURT: All right, those of you whose names 
have been read, you're on the jury, you need to stay here. 
The rest of you are free to go. If you want to stay and 
watch, you're free to do so, but you'll have to watch from 
the spectator's seats. And those of you who were summoned 
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here whose names were not called at all, you're also free 
to go, including you, Mr. Johnson. Thank you for being 
here. Make sure the clerks know where to send your check. 
And don't spend it all in one place. 
It looks like we got the right number in the jury 
box, I always worry about that. Would you please stand and 
raise your right hand. The clerk will place you under oath 
to try this particular case. 
(The jurors were sworn.) 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. I'm going to 
excuse you in just a minute, and I think we'll take a 
relatively long break this morning, because I need to talk 
to the lawyers about how we're going to proceed today. And 
so we'll be working, but there's no reason why you need to 
be here while we're doing that. And this will give you a 
chance to talk to your employer or to your family and let 
them know that you're going to be on the jury. Every time 
we part I'm going to have to tell you something, and I want 
to make sure you understand what it means. Every time we 
take a recess, I have to say you're not to discuss this 
case with anyone, you're not to allow anyone to discuss the 
case in your presence, and you're not to make up your mind 
as to any issue until it's finally submitted to you for a 
decision. 
As you're hearing the evidence, I want you to 
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evaluate it, I want you to form impressions, but I want you 
to keep an open mind and not make up your mind as to who's 
right or wrong in this case until you've heard all of the 
evidence. Because if you make up your mind too soon, 
that's not fair to the person who presents his evidence 
last. So that's why I'm going to be reminding you of that. 
I say that every time you part not because I think you 
can't remember it, but because the law requires that I do 
so. This means that you don't talk to each other about 
what you think of that last witness, or how you think one 
side is doing. That may be a little awkward, because the 
one thing a LI of you have in common is this case, but 
you'll have plenty of chance to talk about it when the case 
is over in the jury room. And our rules are that that's 
when you start discussing the case amongst yourselves. 
Now, if someone -- if you happen to be outside in 
the hallway and a witness or a spectator starts talking 
about a case, if you can't get away to where you can't hear 
them, just say, please, I'm on the jury, don't talk about 
the case when you're around me. And if that problem 
persists, then let the bailiff know, this is the bailiff, 
or you let one of my clerks know downstairs in the clerks' 
office, or I always have a clerk here with me in the 
courtroom. This also means, we don't say this 
specifically, but the law also requires that you not visit 
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even casually with anyone involved in the case, even if 
you1re not visiting about the case. Even if you're talking 
about how the San Francisco Giants and the Arizona 
Diamondbacks are doing in the pennant race. It's important 
that you not talk to any of these people who are seated at 
these tables, or to anyone who is one of their witnesses. 
Now, you won't necessarily know the witnesses, 
unless you recognize their face, unless they've already 
testified, so I'm going to ask that the lawyers also inform 
their witnesses not to talk to any of the jurors. We had a 
case once in San Juan County where on the third day of 
trial one of the witnesses offered a job to one of the 
jurors, and the judge had to declare a mistrial. All the 
effort was wasted that had gone into the trial at that 
point. So if you're talking even casually with someone who 
is involved in the case, then I have to inquire what were 
you talking about, has it influenced you, and someone may 
want me to declare a mistrial, and I may have to do so. 
Then everyone's effort is wasted. So even though it may 
feel a little awkward, and you may be the friendliest 
person in the world and want to talk to people and think 
you're not influenced by visiting with a witness about 
something unrelated to the case, it's important that we 
maintain some distance while this case is going on. 
Now, you can talk to the bailiff to find out 
34 
where you need to be and when, or to ask questions about 
what's expected of you as a juror. You can also ask those 
same questions of the clerk or of me if you catch me, 
and — because we're not on either person's side in this 
case. But even casual conversation with the people who are 
advocates or witnesses in this case, or even parties, 
that's a problem and it may cause concern, so please 
maintain some distance. 
Your family or your co-workers may be curious 
about the case, tell them you can't talk about the case 
until it's all over with, then you can tell them anything 
you want. But these parties have agreed that the decision 
of you eight jurors will be binding, not the decision of 
you eight jurors and anybody you talk to between now and 
the end of the trial. And the case needs to be — or the 
decision needs to be based on the evidence that's presented 
in the courtroom, not on what you may hear from somebody 
else, which can be entirely unreliable. 
Okay, that's said, that little lecture's over 
with, let me welcome you to this case. I hope that you'll 
find that it's an enjoyable experience. It's going to be 
longer than most of our trials, but not six months like the 
0. J. Simpson trial. And I'll try to keep it moving as 
quickly as I can. I'm going to give you — I'm going to 
excuse you until a quarter to 11:00, that's about 45 
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minutes from now. And during that recess, don't discuss 
J this case with anyone r don't allow anyone to discuss it in 
1 your presence, and don't make your mind up as to any issue 
J until it's finally submitted to you for decision. Go ahead 
and let them out. 
Mr. Daisy. 
MR. DAISY: 
THE BAILIFF 
charge in Arizona. 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
Yes, sir. 
: Mr. Daisy says he had a felony 
(Inaudible). 
What was it, what was the charge? 
Felony theft. 
Felony theft? 
Yeah. 
And you were found guilty by a jury, 
or did you plead guilty? 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
problems since then? 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
I just pled guilty. 
Okay. Have you had any other 1 
No, sir. I 
Were you placed on probation? 1 
Yeah. 
Did you complete your probation? 1 
Okay, have you gone back to try to have it expunged or J 
reduced? 
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MR. DAISY: It's old. 
What did you take? 
A door from the junk yard. 
You took a door from a junk yard and 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAISY: 
THE COURT: 
that was a felony? 
MR. DAISY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything more you folks need 
to know about that before we talk about it? 
MR. HASKINS: When was this? 
THE COURT: 1985. All right, I'm going to let 
you go, Mr. Daisy. When you come back, we'll let you know 
what we've decided. Okay, any suggestions on what I do 
about Mr. Daisy? 
MR. RUSSELL: I don't have any problem letting 
him stay on, Your Honor. If it's jurisdictional or 
mandatory, then I guess that would be something for the 
Court to consider, but I don't object to having him stay. 
THE COURT: Well, it's not jurisdictional, you 
can waive the problem. If it was 15 years ago, if it had 
been committed in Utah he could have had it expunged by 
now, assuming everything he tells me is true. But it isn't 
expunged, so technically I think he's — he should have 
been excused. And I'm just sorry that he didn't see fit to 
tell us this earlier. Mr. Haskins, what's your view? 
MR. HASKINS: I just have a question about this, 
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Your Honor. Procedurally here in this county are 
questionnaires sent out where that question is specifically 
asked? 
THE COURT: Yes. I haven't looked, obviously I 
don't have his questionnaire in front of me. Maybe he 
mentioned something, and we didn't pick up on it. 
MR. HASKINS: So would it be the responsibility 
of the court's office then to catch that and make sure that 
he wasn't called? 
THE COURT: If it's in the questionnaire. We 
don't run a criminal history on each juror. 
MR. HASKINS: Is there any possibility we could 
get a copy of that questionnaire? I guess my concern is 
this, let's assume that what he states is correct and he's 
been forthcoming, and walked in and exposing himself to all 
of us here with regard to this problem, my question is, if 
a questionnaire was submitted and he completed that and 
didn't disclose that, that's something we have to consider. 
MR. LALLI: I agree with that, Your Honor. I'm 
also a little bit uncomfortable that we didn't have the 
opportunity to consider that factor when we were exercising 
our challenges. 
THE COURT: I agree. Although, it's not — well, 
if he'd have disclosed it, I'd just have excused him, and 
it would have been very easy to get rid of him and put 
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somebody else in his seat. But now I've sent everybody 
else away. And we can have somebody look for that 
questionnaire and it will take half an hour to do that, 
then you can look at it and he may have mentioned it, he 
may*not have mentioned it. My clerks usually don't miss 
those kinds of things, if he mentioned it, I think they 
would have caught it. So I think you can probably — I 
think the odds are about 90, 95 percent if not higher that 
he didn't mention it. And I wonder whether it's worth 
taking the time to ascertain that, rather than just proceed 
on the assumption that he failed to mention it in his 
questionnaire. If he failed to mention it in his 
questionnaire what do you want me to do, Mr. Haskins and 
Mr. Lalli? Mr. Russell says he can stay. Do you want me 
to excuse him? That's really the only option I have, 
either excuse him and declare a mistrial, or excuse him and 
you can agree to proceed with seven jurors. And then we'll 
have to talk about whether — 
MR. HASKINS: Can you give us five minutes so I 
can consult with my client, Your Honor, and consult with 
Mr. Lalli? 
THE COURT: Yes. I'm just going to go off the 
record. I don't want to be bopping in and out of the 
courtroom. 
(Recess.) 
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THE COURT: All right, we're back on the record. 
Let me just tell you that while you've been conferring for 
about half an hour, we have obtained the questionnaire for 
Mr. Daisy and the questionnaire does not make any mention 
of his felony conviction in Arizona. Also I asked the 
bailiff to run a criminal history and there's no criminal 
history from Arizona. There is an indication that Mr. 
Daisy was fingerprinted in Arizona in 1982 and again in 
1987. He does have some DUIs in his history, but those 
aren't felonies. So I think we're still in the position 
where unless all parties can stipulate on some way to 
proceed here, I'm going to have to declare a mistrial, or 
take the unusual step of sending the bailiff out to find 
some more jurors, and even then we'd have to stipulate on 
how that's to be done. Because since we've already 
summoned the jury, we'd have to agree on how to address the 
right to preemptory challenges. So, Mr. Russell. 
MR. RUSSELL: I'm in favor of anything that 
allows us to go forward, whether it be a panel of seven and 
we agree are okay with having six out of the seven have to 
return a verdict; I'm okay with bringing in people from the 
panel or off the street under any circumstances. However, 
I have spoken to the Normans and they do want the case to 
be tried to a jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
40 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, our position is we're 
concerned about Mr. Daisy. We would be willing to go forth 
with a bench trial, of course, but it sounds like that's 
not an option. We'd also be willing to go forward with 
seven jurors today, provided that we'd have, I think, a six 
vote requirement. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Haskins. 
MR. HASKINS: Thank you, Your Honor. Our 
position is, Your Honor, my client's position is that we 
move for a mistrial at this point. We oppose to try it in 
court, Your Honor. We would agree to, but my client's not 
satisfied with this jury panel considering the problem with 
Mr. Daisy. We'd move for a mistrial. How the court 
handles that after that, (inaudible). I agree that creates 
real problems for us in terms of exercising preemptories 
and all of these things that are procedurally normally 
done. If we bring somebody off the street I don't know how 
we could accomplish that. I'm surely willing to entertain 
some proposals. We, frankly, haven't conferred about that. 
THE COURT: I suppose in theory I could ask the 
bailiff to go out and see if he could find some of these 
people that I excused, Michael Johnson, and then if you 
could agree to use Mr. Johnson, but I don't know that you 
would agree to that, I can see if I can find Mr. Johnson. 
Or if you think you'd be entitled to preemptory challenge I 
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could say, all right, Mr. Johnson and enough additional 
people so that each side can be a preemptory challenge and 
we go through the qualification process. 
I don't really — I don't really want to do that, 
and I'm not sure that it's in the parties interest to 
proceed with jurors who have been told that they can leave 
and then are then told they have to come back, because I 
don't know whether they'll be able to put aside their 
frustration over being treated in that fashion, and focus 
on the evidence and decide the case. So I don't think I'm 
going -- I'm not going to do that, unless you can all agree 
on what should be done, and that you're willing to waive 
any objections that would flow from that. 
MR. RUSSELL: I don't suppose it's beyond the 
realm of possibility that Mr. Daisy could be mistaken about 
what his record actually is. 
MR. HASKINS: The problem I have with that is 
that he wasn't forthcoming in the questionnaire. If he 
thought he had a felony, he didn't disclose it then, and 
now he comes in and tells us that he does have one. Maybe 
he just wants to get off of the jury, I don't know. But we 
have a real problem with it. 
THE COURT: Well, having a real problem doesn't 
necessarily — 
MR. HASKINS: I agree, but maybe (inaudible). 
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Obviously, though he wasn't forthcoming. If he believes he 
really has a felony, he should have discLosed it in the 
questionnaire, right. And that now he comes in and tells 
you he does have one in Arizona, and then we find out he 
doesn't, I don't know. 
THE COURT: Well, you don't know whether he does 
or not. 
MR. HASKINS: I don't know. 
THE COURT: Criminal histories don't always turn 
everything up. I think I probably have to go with what he 
actually teLls me on questioning. I was pretty specific 
with him, he seemed to know about when it was, he seemed to 
know what it was for, he seemed — he knew that he pled 
guilty and had not been found guilty, that he was placed on 
probation and not put in prison. But that it's over with, 
he doesn't have any further responsibility. 
MR. RUSSELL: What would be your problem, not 
that you have to tell me, but try to (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: If you want to wait until Mr. Daisy 
gets back and question him and see if you can persuade him 
that he really wasn't convicted of a felony, Mr. Russell, I 
suppose I'd give you that chance. But I asked him about 
every question I could, he seemed to be definite about it. 
And I just have no idea why he didn't tell us sooner. 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, how — would there be a 
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possibility of paneling a new jury or a new pool either 
this afternoon or tomorrow morning? 
THE COURT: How do you do that? How do you get 
people appropriate notice for their — to readjust their 
lives? 
MR. LALLI: I'm not familiar with the pool system 
down here. Is it just once a week they come in or — 
THE COURT: We have about 250 people on the list. 
We had a trial last week, and I think they summoned 40 
jurors, we summoned 60 for this. We have had some trials 
previously in this term, at least one and maybe two, and 
so — and it's not like maybe sometimes in Salt Lake City 
they'll have two different judges of summoned panels, and 
the ones that are excused from one panel could be brought 
somewhere else to be used. I have no other source of 
jurors except to summon a new group. 
MR. HASKINS: In Salt Lake what they have is they 
have a continual pool, and so we'll have jurors that are on 
call for the afternoon, and they'll determine they need 
them in the afternoon and the next day. So there's always 
a pool of jurors there just because of the number of 
judges. 
THE COURT: Yeah, you can do that there. I just 
don't have any way to do that here. Well, everyone's 
within their rights in what they're asking for. And 
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unfortunately what they1re asking for never comes together 
in one thing that everybody agrees on, so I don't think I 
have any choice, but to declare a mistrial, and excuse this 
panel of jurors, and we schedule this trial. 
You think you've gotten this close, you think 
we're going to need a full five days to try the case? 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, I think that maybe we 
could (inaudible) by going ahead with the motions in limine 
in ruling today. I know we've had settlement discussion 
and, at least from my perspective, those got hung up 
because we weren't sure what evidence would come in, or 
what wouldn't. It's just a thought. 
THE COURT: If I can help you with any decision I 
have to make, so that it may be more possible for you to 
settle this case, I'll do it, I'll do it today. So once we 
excuse the jury I'll — I will do that. 
MR. HASKINS: I would agree, Your Honor. Motions 
in limine are very relevant to what we're addressing. We 
mediated this case last week, and that was a big issue, was 
the determination of how the Court would rule on motions. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASKINS: So if we could proceed with that, 
I'd appreciate it. 
THE COURT: Well, it's 10:45. Bailiff, will you 
see if we've got the jury here. 
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MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, may — never mind 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Everyone's here but Mr. Daisy. We're 
on the record without the bailiff. You folks can sit down. 
He's not out there? 
THE BAILIFF: I don't see him, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe it's just as well he's 
not here. Members of the jury, this is disappointing to 
me, but I'm — I don't think it's going to hurt your 
feelings too much, we're not going to be able to try this 
case. What happened is after we'd gone through all that 
process Mr. Daisy told me that he'd been convicted of a 
felony, which disqualifies him from being a juror. And he 
had been, you heard me ask it in the courtroom this 
morning, he'd been asked it in his questionnaire and he 
didn't disclose it in his questionnaire that he returned. 
But I had to disqualify him. 
And we have been exploring for the past 45 
minutes whether there was some way we could agree to 
proceed without Mr. Daisy or with Mr. Daisy, and the 
parties have not all three been able to agree on any 
particular course of action. So I really don't have any 
viable options, except to declare a mistrial and to excuse 
you. And I'll have to reschedule this trial. I guess the 
only good news about that, is that we didn't get three days 
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into the trial and then take this action. We're doing it 
right here at the start, so we haven't wasted too much of 
your time. 
I know it's disappointing to the parties that 
wanted to get this case tried. I've been, not personally, 
but I've seen close family members in these shoes before, 
and it's — you know, you work yourself up, you think 
you're going to have this case resolved, and it doesn't get 
resolved, and that's disappointing. It's a failure of our 
system. I just wish I could have foreseen this, but this 
completely hit me out of the blue. 
So I'm going to let you go, and you're excused 
from any further obligation. I think I'm going to excuse 
you for the rest of the term as well, so if we summoned you 
between now and the end of the year, say Judge Anderson 
told me I could be excused. This case is going to be 
rescheduled, it's going to be rescheduled in early 2001, 
and you won't be on the jury list by then anyway. So thank 
you for being here, and I wish we could have accomplished 
something more than we did. We are going to talk about the 
case a little bit more here and I need to make some 
rulings, and maybe that will help the people in this case 
settle their dispute. 
All right, let's address, we have a motion in 
limine. What else do we have? 
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MR. LALLI: I think we have several motions in 
limine, Your Honor, and then Mr. Russell had filed, I 
believe, (inaudible) method of presenting the case to the 
jury. Although, I think that that entails (inaudible) 
issue that we could probably discuss and resolve. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you start with your 
motion, Mr. Lalli. 
MR. LALLI: We made one motion, Your Honor, and 
if I could take the Court back to the summary judgment 
hearing we had a few weeks ago. At that time, the Court 
dismissed a fiduciary duty cause of action and the punitive 
damages claim that went along with that, leaving two 
contract claims in place. 
The first cause of action is for breach of the 
joint venture agreement. And the Normans theory in that 
instance is even though my client, Mark Arnold, is not a 
signatory on that agreement, that sometime Mr. Arnold 
purchased the interest of one of the joint venture 
partners, and that's a fact in dispute, but that's their 
contention. And then some several months after that, in 
May of 1996, they claim that they consented to admit Mark 
Arnold as a partner in the joint venture. And that when 
Arnold became a partner in the joint venture, he therefore 
became obligated on the joint venture agreement. We have 
trouble with various points of that, both factually and 
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legally. And I'd be happy to explain that to the Court if 
we need to address the legal issues. 
The second cause of action that remains is for --
THE COURT: Let me just ask, what does Norman say 
Mr. Arnold is obligated to do as a joint venture partner 
that he didn't do? 
MR. LALLI: Well, and, you know, Your Honor, I 
think the Court will have to ask them that because it's not 
really clear to me. And, you know, this goes to one of — 
the heart of our motion in limine, is there's not only a 
question, as the Court points out, of what did Arnold do 
that would have violated any provision in that agreement, I 
think the answer to that is nothing. But even assuming 
that they could point to something, the only evidence that 
they've talked about in this case, and it's the evidence 
that I want to exclude, is evidence that occurred before 
May 1 of 1996, when they claim that they somehow through 
their conduct consented to admit Arnold as a partner. 
And the Court may recall me arguing this at the 
summary judgment hearing. We put deposition testimony in 
the record where the Normans had both admitted that they 
never consented to admit Mark Arnold as a partner in the 
joint venture, and that's in the record. And from my 
perspective, the Court's question was, well, whether or not 
they may have consented by some constructive consent 
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through their conduct, and the Court bound this over for 
trial on that factual issue. But even if that were true, 
if the conduct that they're talking about is all conduct 
that occurred before they claim they even knew that Arnold 
had- entered into this agreement under which he purportedly 
purchased the interest of Pete Lanto. 
Let me identify the five categories of evidence. 
There are terms concerning the Young loan, which is the 
loan for $160,000; there is information about a development 
in Park City that happened in the summer of 1995; there is 
information about the preparation of the promissory note 
and the deed of trust on the $160,000 loan; and therefs 
information about the expenditure of the loan proceeds; and 
also, the fifth category is Mr. Arnold's relationship with 
Jim Winkler, who is the individual that eventually 
purchased the Norman's property. 
Maybe to try and make this easier, I can paint a 
time line for the Court. The joint venture was entered 
into in March of 1995. A couple of months later in June, 
that's when there was this, I've referred to it as the 
Young loan, or the $160,000 loan. And that's when the 
Normans signed a promissory note and a deed of trust. And, 
of course, the preparation of the note and deed of trust 
occurred in connection with that. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Arnold prepared those 
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Okay. 
They were prepared by a gentleman 
documents? 
MR. LALLI: He did not, 
THE COURT: 
MR. LALLI 
named Chris Durling. 
THE COURT: Okay. The loan was made to the 
partnership, or just to the Normans? 
MR. LALLI: The loan was made to the partnership. 
And this actually gets us to the second contract claim that 
remains, which is a breach, or it's styled in the 
complaint, a default on a trust deed note. On the trust 
deed note, there are six co-obligors, there's Robert 
Norman, Diane Norman, Greg Page, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, 
and Norman Larson. Mark Arnold is not a signatory on that 
promissory note, but that happened in June of 1996 — f95, 
excuse me, !95. Around, sometime after that, Page and 
Barney approached Mark Arnold and said that in addition to 
working to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab, they were also 
working to develop one in Park City. 
THE COURT: When was that? 
MR. LALLI: That was, I believe it was a couple 
of months after the trust deed. So I think it was sometime 
in July or August. And Mark Arnold went up to Park City, 
negotiated an earnest money payment with the seller of that 
property, obtained a check from the joint ventures bank 
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account, and made a $10,000 earnest money payment that was 
later refunded. 
THE COURT: So this same joint venture — 
MR. LALLI: Well, that's a factual dispute. 
There will be testimony from the Normans that they were 
excluded from that Park City development. There will be 
testimony from others that the intent was that they be 
included. But it all really became a moot point because 
nothing ever happened, the $10,000 was refunded and that 
development never went anywhere. 
THE COURT: The earnest money did come from the 
joint venture? 
MR. LALLI: It came from the proceeds of the 
$160,000 loan. After that, between really June of 1995 and 
mid August or so, most of the $160,000 was paid out, and 
there will be evidence about how that was paid out, if it 
comes in, that's one of the things we're trying to exclude. 
It was paid out for various construction costs and planning 
things, and some interest payments on the loan, and also 
as — for commitment fees, upfront money that they had to 
give to potential financiers in order to investigate 
whether or not they could make a loan on this property. 
Then on October 27 of 1995, that is when, again, 
the joint venture partners, Page and Barney primarily, 
asked Mark Arnold to negotiate a buyout of Lanto's interest 
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1 I in the joint venture. And Mark Arnold did go and he 
2 negotiated that buyout for $8,500. And there is a one-page 
3 document entitled purchase agreement, in which Mark Arnold 
4 J and Western Empire Advisors, which is Norm Larson's 
5 company, they purport to purchase the interest of Pete 
6 Lanto. And there's — 
7 THE COURT: Who is this, Western Empire and who? 
8 MR. LALLI: And Mark Arnold. And there's a 
9 factual dispute about what the parties actually intended. 
10 Mr. Arnold will testify that he was asked to affect this 
11 I buyout of Lantofs interest on behalf of the joint venture, 
12 and that, you know, he wasn't intending to become a member 
13 of the joint venture, and didn't. The document actually on 
14 I its face says that there is this purchase, so there's a 
15 factual dispute about that. Then that's October 27 of 
16 1995. 
17 I Then the next significant event happens on May 
18 1st of 1996. And that's when the Normans claim that they 
19 first learned about the October 27, 1995 purchase 
20 J agreement. And in their depositions I asked them both the 
21 question, did you consent to Mark Arnold becoming a partner 
22 in the joint venture, and they both said, no. They said, 
23 J never. And I can pull those deposition cites out. 
24 Sometime after May of 1996, in the summer, Mark Arnold 
25 I introduced the Normans to a fellow named Jim Winkler. 
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THE COURT: This is when, in the summer of f96. 
MR. LALLI: This is the summer of f96. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: And by that time all the money had 
long been spent, all the $160,000 had long been spent. 
Page and Barney had gone their separate ways, sort of 
abandoned the project, and Mr. Larson was in the process of 
phasing out at that time as well. And Mark Arnold was 
trying to help the Normans as best he could and he 
introduced them to Jim Winkler, who in 1996 assumed the 
Young loan. He actually paid the Youngs off and assumed 
that loan, the promissory note. 
THE COURT: When did he do that? 
MR. LALLI: He did that in July or August of 
1996. And then two years — nothing happened, Mr. Winkler 
didn't demand payment, he didn't threaten foreclosure, but 
two years later, the Normans were in need of money and they 
approached Mr. Winkler about purchasing the property, and 
he agreed to do that. They agreed upon a price, he 
purchased the property for $420,000. And from the sales 
proceeds, $212,000 were deducted. And that $212,000 was 
the amount, which had included interest by that time, 
that's the amount that's really in dispute in this lawsuit. 
The Normans said they had to in effect pay that on the 
original promissory note. That money went to Winkler. 
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The point in our motion in limine, there are 
really two: One is that the five categories of evidence, 
and let me just run through those again: There's the 
information about the terms of the Young loan, what was the 
interest rate, what were the points and the fees, things 
like that; the Park City negotiations, is two; the third is 
the preparation of the note and deed of trust; the fourth 
is how the $160,000 loan proceeds were spent; and the fifth 
is Arnold's relationship with Winkler. 
Our first contention is simply that that 
information is not relevant to the two remaining claims. 
The first claim is for breach of the joint venture 
agreement. 
THE COURT: What's the third category again? 
MR. LALLI: The third category is preparation of 
the promissory note and deed of trust. One of the things 
that the Normans contend is that the original note that 
they signed was for $40,000, and they say that someone 
later switched that to make it 160,000. The only 
documentation that anybody has says 160,000, and there will 
be plenty of testimony, including from the people who were 
involved in preparing it, that it was always 160,000. But 
that's one of the categories of evidence. 
And our first contention is that on strictly 
relevance grounds, it's not relevant to either of the two 
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1 contract claims, for this reason: On the joint venture 
2 agreement claim, what they need to prove is, first of all, 
3 that Arnold did purchase Lanto's interest, that's a factual 
4 question. The second thing they have to prove is that 
5 there was unanimous consent of all of the existing partners 
6 I to admit Arnold to the partnership. And as I've indicated, 
7 J the Normans have both testified under oath that they never 
8 I consented to that. And the third point they would have to 
9 prove, as the Court indicated earlier, that Arnold breached 
10 some provision of this joint venture agreement. 
11 J Well, none of the five things allow you to help. 
12 I mean, the terms of the loan don't help you understand 
13 whether or not Arnold became a partner or breached a joint 
14 I venture agreement. The Park City negotiation, that doesn't 
15 help you understand whether or not Arnold became a partner, 
16 J or whether he breached a joint venture agreement. And the 
17 same goes for the other five categories of evidence. 
18 I But even if you were to get past that hurdle, and 
19 I even if you could somehow fashion an argument that these 
20 categories of evidence were somehow probative to a breach 
21 of a joint venture claim, there's a real problem with time. 
22 And that is that the earliest, the very earliest that 
23 J Arnold could have become a partner in the joint venture, 
24 J and this assumes that the Normans are somehow able to 
25 J contradict their sworn testimony and convince the Court or 
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the jury that somehow they consented by their conduct, the 
earliest that could have happened was May 1st of 1996, when 
they say they first learned about the Lanto purchase 
agreement. Well, if Arnold couldn't — if they couldn't 
have consented until May 1, f96, that is the earliest date 
on which Arnold could have become a partner. And itfs the 
earliest date on which he could have been obligated under 
the partnership agreement. And therefore, the acts that he 
had committed or omitted the previous year, they couldn't 
be the basis for him breaching a partnership agreement. In 
July or so of 1995 when he went up to Park City and 
negotiated this transaction, even under the Normans theory 
he wasn't a partner, he wasn't bound by the partnership 
agreement, and so that act, you know, six months or nine 
months earlier, that can't be considered a breach of the 
partnership obligation or partnership agreement when Arnold 
became a partner. 
The only one of the four categories of evidence 
at the subject of this motion that occurred after the 
Normans learned about Arnold becoming a partner is the 
relationship with Jim Winkler. And, you know, our motion 
on that is simply on relevance grounds, that Mark Arnold 
introducing Jim Winkler to the Normans who ultimately ended 
up assuming the loan and purchasing the property, that's 
just not probative of whether or not Arnold did something 
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in violation of the joint venture agreement. I mean, 
there!s nothing in the joint venture agreement that 
prohibits a partner from introducing the other partners to 
Jim Winkler. 
THE COURT: Somebody with money. 
MR. LALLI: Somebody with money. So that's the 
first claim. And there's a similar analysis with the 
default on the promissory note claim. And the Normans 
theory is basically the same, that when Arnold became, or 
when he entered into this purchase agreement with Lanto in 
October of 1995, one of the things that it says in there is 
that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors will hold Lanto 
harmless for, among other things, liability on the $160,000 
promissory note. But, again, there's this timing problem, 
because with the exception, again, of the Winkler 
relationship, everything else happened before October 27 of 
1995. So if Arnold became obligated on the promissory note 
on the date he purportedly purchased Lanto's interest, the 
evidence still wouldn't come in for the same reason. The 
things he'd done before that date they can't become, you 
know, that can't be the basis for a breach of contract once 
he became a party to the contract. 
Now, aside from the timing problem, there is a 
much more fundamental problem on that purchase agreement, 
and that is — and it's really one of standing, that Arnold 
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and Western Empire Advisors agreed in there to basically 
indemnify, to hold harmless, Lanto for any obligation that 
Lanto might have on the promissory note. And what that 
means is that Lanto may have a cause of action against 
Arnold or Western Empire Advisors, but the Normans don't. 
I mean, the Normans were co-obligors on the promissory 
note. If you look at the promissory note, there's six 
signatures, the Normans are two of them, Page, Barney, 
Lanto, and Norm Larson. And so what they're claiming in 
effect is that Arnold became Lanto on that joint venture 
agreement. But that's not the legal effect of this October 
27, 1995 purchase agreement, even if you believe the 
Norman's story. The legal effect of that is that it gives 
Pete Lanto an indemnification claim against Western Empire 
Advisors and Mark Arnold, at most, it doesn't give the 
Normans. 
So because of those things, that is the basis of 
our motion. There's the timing problem, there's just a 
straight relevance problem, that it's not probative. And 
finally, on the promissory note claim, there's a standing 
issue. And — 
THE COURT: Well, certainly the Normans could 
have sued Lanto and stepped into the shoes and ultimately 
acquired Lanto's right to seek indemnification, right? If 
Lanto owes the Normans something, then ultimately the 
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Normans would have the right to obtain what Lanto has, 
which is the right for indemnification. 
MR. LALLI: If they — well — 
THE COURT: Or Lanto — 
MR. LALLI: Not unless Lanto assigned that to 
them. I assume Lanto could assign them whatever rights he 
had. 
THE COURT: Or they could have acquired it by 
executing on it. 
MR. LALLI: Well, I don't know that you can 
execute on a contractual obligation, that would probably be 
an issue that we'd be arguing about if that had ever 
occurred, but it's really a moot point because that never 
occurred. 
THE COURT: Where is Lanto, why is he not in 
this? 
MR. LALLI: Well, that's a question that you'll 
have to ask Mr. Russell. He's never been — I believe he 
was originally sued as a defendant, I don't know that he 
was served. He certainly hasn't been involved when I have. 
And you can even take it one step further than that, Your 
Honor, and what we're talking about is six co-obligors, and 
that they agreed to pay back the Youngs $160,000 plus 
interest. I mean, there is an obligation running between 
the co-obligors and the Youngs. And what the Normans are 
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1 saying is that somehow Arnold became Lanto, became one of 
2 I the co-obligors, and they're trying to use this promissory 
3 note as saying that somehow the co-obligors now have a 
4 cause of action against their other co-obligor. And 
5 that — because they paid 100 percent of it, that they can 
6 shift that all to somebody else. 
7 THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what I think 
8 I about that, because I'm pretty clear on that. I don't 
9 J think anybody's going to change my mind with argument, 
10 maybe with a case, but not with argument. If people 
11 jointly sign a promissory note, as far as the person in 
12 whose favor the note runs, any one of them is responsible. 
13 But it's between the makers, each of them is equally 
14 responsible. So --
15 MR. LALLI: Equally meaning --
16 THE COURT: Unless otherwise indicated, each of 
17 them has -- if there's seven signers, each of them is 
18 obligated to pay a seventh. Unless there's some other 
19 division of that. 
20 MR. LALLI: Well, and again, that's not a cause 
21 of action that's before this Court. They've never — 
22 I they've never pled a cause of action for essentially 
23 contribution, is what I think you'd call that. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah, contribution. 
25 MR. LALLI: That's never been part of this 
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lawsuit. And what they're saying is that Mark Arnold is 
jointly and severally, that is 100 percent liable for 
whatever was paid out on the note. 
And, you know, there's also another point on 
payment on the note, the note was never declared in 
default, nobody ever foreclosed, nobody ever executed. The 
Youngs didn't come to the Normans and say, we're going to 
foreclose, you've got to get somebody else in. Winkler 
came in, he assumed the loan, and then he did nothing for 
two years, he wasn't going to the Normans asking them to 
pay. I mean, ultimately the Normans went to him. During 
that time, the Normans didn't ask any of their alleged 
partners to pay. And so there was really never a default 
on this promissory note. 
THE COURT: Let me tell you on that where I think 
I'd rule, if I were deciding, and where I think the jury 
would be instructed to go. That is that even though it 
wasn't ever formerly foreclosed and declared in default, if 
it ended up being paid, in effect, by deducting it from the 
proceeds of the sale, then it is paid, and they have the 
right to contribution from the other makers of the 
promissory note. 
MR. LALLI: Well, and that may be the correct 
legal analysis, and it's not really the point I'm trying to 
make. The point I'm trying to make, and I think this 
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1 I really is an overarching point that's going to cover, not 
2 I only our motion in limine, but the motions that Mr. Russell 
3 has made, and particularly his proposed method for 
4 presenting the case to the jury. Is Mr. Russell is not — 
5 I mean, he's trying to go outside the pleading. He's 
6 trying to present evidence, and evidence about causes of 
7 action that have never been a part of this lawsuit. And 
8 his theory is somehow that you can just get whatever 
9 information into evidence that you want, and that at the 
10 end of the day, at the end of trial, well, we'll just have 
11 the judge rewrite the pleadings to conform them to the 
12 evidence. But, of course, that's not what rule 15 permits. 
13 Rule 15 permits him to get evidence in, so long as it is 
14 relevant to the claims surviving existing in the complaint. 
15 And right now, that's a breach of the joint venture 
16 agreement, and a default on promissory note. It's not 
17 fraud, it's not breach of fiduciary duty, it's not even 
18 contribution. And that is the problem. 
19 He wants to litigate a case that's just not here. 
20 And for whatever strategic reason he's had, it's not here. 
21 And we can only go forward with evidence on the claims that 
22 exist. And as I've explained, the five categories that I'm 
23 talking about are not relevant to that. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Did you want to add anything, 
25 Mr. Haskins, do you have a position on that? 
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MR. HASKINS: A couple things that I think 
probably if we're trying this together, Mr. Larson's claims 
with regard to the contract, this joint venture agreement 
is relevant. Firstly, it's agreed by the Normans that Mr. 
Larson was never consented to by them, not even in May of 
1996, to be a joint venture partner. So that gets us to, 
at least on the time line of October of 1995 that is 
claimed by Arnold, the first time you can address those 
particular issues. 
THE COURT: So Larson wasn't a partner? 
MR. HASKINS: Larson, it's admitted by the 
Normans. They claim now that he's a joint venturer, and 
he's jointly and severally liable now under their two 
causes of action, because he is a joint venturer, and thus 
he is jointly and severally liable on the promissory note. 
THE COURT: But he wasn't a party to the March 
1995 agreement? 
MR. HASKINS: No, neither was Mr. Arnold. 
THE COURT: Was he a party to the June 1995 Young 
promissory note? 
MR. HASKINS: He was, he signed the promissory 
note. What he had done was, Mr. Page had come to him and 
asked him to do the financing, to do the financing for this 
project. Well, because of the financial, respective 
financial positions of all the parties, he's the only one 
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that qualified to get the franchise agreement. So he put 
out his $40,000 to buy the franchise agreement with the 
understanding that these parties, Page, Barney, and the 
Normans would repay him for the purchase of that franchise. 
He did that. They came to him and said, you're not going 
to get paid any $40,000 unless you sign on this promissory 
note. Well, he looked at the property that was encumbered 
on the note, the trust deed note was signed contemporaneous 
with the promissory note, and he looked at it and says, I 
don't have anything to lose here because the property's 
worth, according to their appraisal, $450,000. So I'm not 
going to lose, and this is the only way I'm going to get my 
$40,000 back. I'm not part of this deal. 
TH£] COURT: So he believed he was liable on the 
promissory note only to the extent that there was a 
deficiency after application of the security? 
MR. HASKINS: That's right, that's right. And so 
plus that's the only way he was going to get his $40,000 
back. The misrepresentations by Mr. Page, who the 
plaintiffs in this case agree was the primary contact, he 
was the person that talked to them about everything other 
than Mr. Barney. And they were sued initially in this, but 
they've both filed bankruptcy, and thus we're left with two 
people standing, Mr. Larson and Mr. Arnold. 
THE COURT: Do you have any idea why Lanto isn't 
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here? 
MR. HASKINS: I have no idea. I do know I read a 
pleading submitted by Mr. Russell claiming they tried to 
contact him, and they never could. What efforts were done 
in that regard were never expressly stated in the pleadings 
that I did review. So I have no idea why in that shotgun 
approach of things Mr. Lanto was not — or Mr. Rasmussen, 
Mr. Rasmussen originally signed on this joint venture 
agreement that was signed back in f95, my client didn't 
even know existed until this lawsuit was filed, and he read 
it as part of the pleadings. 
However, further than that in October of f95 when 
Mr. Lanto1s interest is allegedly purchased, and there are 
some factual disputes about all of that, that was 
between -- that was a document, we understand, drafted by 
Mr. Arnold, where it was going to be purchased by Mr. 
Arnold and Western Empire Advisors. Again, Western Empire 
Advisors was not sued in this case, just Norm Larson. 
Western Empire Advisors is the corporation that Mr. Larson 
does business under, and does all his financing. 
In fact, the service agreement that was signed 
between the parties, that was signed by Mr. Page 
representing the joint venture at that time was between 
Western Empire Advisors and the joint venture, as 
represented by Mr. Page, not Mr. Larson. So we agree that 
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this evidence should be excluded. 
Further with regard to the promissory note and 
the right to indemnification under that promissory note, 
I've done substantial research on this, and I just don't 
see how they can amend their pleadings under 15. I've 
heard a memorandum in response to this that I was going to 
argue, frankly, at the end of their case in chief. How 
they can now amend their pleadings and claim contribution 
and all these partnership issues when the only claim is 
they (inaudible) to the promissory note, and it's joint in 
several liability. Well, that joint and several liability 
went from the signers to the Youngs, it didn't go to the 
Normans. It didn't go to anyone else but the Youngs. And 
it's all, everyone agrees the Youngs were satisfied. 
Anyway, based upon that and those facts we agree 
with Mr. Lalli that this evidence ought to be excluded. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASKINS: Thanks. 
THE COURT: Mr. Russell, I appreciate you've been 
sitting there patiently. I'm sure there's lots of things 
you've heard you disagree with, so now you can tell me 
about it. 
MR. RUSSELL: Actually, Your Honor, it is 
necessary for us to go outside the pleadings in this case 
to some extent. Most of this you've heard before, and 
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obviously hope everything that we say is not evidence and 
falls, virtually, all of it disputed. I've never been 
involved in a case like this before, Your Honor. I've 
never been involved in a case where most of what the 
plaintiffs know about the case they didn't find out until 
after the case was filed. What the defendants are asking 
is that the Normans be placed in an ever narrowing and 
shrinking box, and let's just forget about everything that 
we did, because it occurred at a time before the Normans 
knew about what they were doing. 
The pleadings, I'll tell you quite frankly, don't 
go to the case, because we didn't know what our case was 
until -- Mr. Larson was deposed on February 17, 1999, Mr. 
Arnold was deposed after that, and we're still finding out 
things today. I got a fax from Jim Winkler last week of a 
document that I'd never seen before that answered a piece 
of a puzzle. One thing that I've said before that I really 
need the Court to — 
THE COURT: So starting in 1999 is when you first 
got a clue of what had really happened here? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, we had clues, but we hadn't 
talked to these defendants before. We hadn't gotten the 
exhibits. Most of the exhibits that we're going to use in 
the trial came from the defendants, the Normans didn't have 
them until they were produced in discovery. We are not, 
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the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement that's 
mentioned in the claim, true, that was a piece of paper 
that we had. But we are not limiting ourselves to this 
agreement. When we say joint venture, we mean what it says 
in the statute, which is a group of two or more people 
doing business together as joint owners. There was a joint 
venture to build a Holiday Inn on the Norman's property in 
Moab, there was. And I don't think that the defendants 
will deny that. It didn't go by this agreement. This 
case, because the Normans thought that they were in 
business with these defendants, is why it was plugged that 
way. In truth, what we'll prove is that the Normans were 
just used because they had a piece of property that a loan 
could be secured on and, then the defendants did with the 
money what they wanted to. Now, what you'd call that I, 
frankly, don't know if what you'd call that is a cause of 
action, but that is what happened. 
THE COURT: Why don't you give me the time line 
of events as you see it. 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay. It starts — before their 
time line even starts Four D Development was composed of 
Page, Barney, and Lanto. And do you want to know why 
Lanto's not here, because he — his interest was bought by 
Arnold and Larson, paid for with the funds from the Young 
loan, and those defendants indemnified it. But Four D 
by 
Development, Page, Barney, and Lanto, had a franchise, for 
a Holiday Inn in Park City they got at the end of 1994, and 
they were dealing with defendant Larson. I don't know when 
it started, but we have correspondence from defendant 
Larson — 
THE COURT: So by the end of 1994 Page, Barney, 
and Lanto had a franchise for a Park City Holiday Inn? 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. The Moab Land Development 
Joint Venture was signed on March 15, or at least partially 
signed on March 15. 
THE COURT: How did that happen? I mean, whose 
idea was that? Did these folks come to Mr. Norman and say, 
Mr. Norman we want to build a Holiday Inn in Moab also, or 
was Mr. Norman looking around for someone? 
MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Norman was interested in having 
a Holiday Inn developed. I think Mr. Norman contacted 
Duane Barney. Duane Barney was managing the Spanish Fork 
Holiday Inn, and they'd met there, or somewhere around 
there, and they got the idea to develop it. Four D came 
down --
THE COURT: So Mr. Norman figures, I want to put 
a motel, or I want to put a motel on my property, and I 
want it to be a Holiday Inn, or at least that's one of the 
possibilities he's considering. And he goes — he's in 
Spanish Fork and sees that there's a Holiday Inn in Spanish 
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Fork and talks to this guy, Duane Barney, there, and that 
starts, that's what makes this contact, that gets this 
going? 
MR. RUSSELL: I think so. Page Barney and Lanto 
then came down to Moab, looked at the property, started 
running numbers, started making plans. Mr. Arnold and Mr. 
Larson were down in Moab in April of 1995 at the Norman's 
house. 
THE COURT: Who were down there? 
MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Arnold and Mr. Larson both came 
down with Page and Barney, they were at the Norman's house. 
Arnold as an attorney, Larson as a financial guy. Larson 
was offering to buy their house, and do this, and do that. 
But they met them before — 
THE COURT: So they knew Arnold as a lawyer, 
Larson as a guy with money? 
MR. RUSSELL: Or — 
THE COURT: Who knows how to find it. 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: So the joint venture agreement that 
you've seen gets signed in March, and there's ongoing 
discussions about it. In April a letter from Larson to 
Greg Page, he's talking about a trip that he recently took 
down to Arizona to get funding for the two Holiday Inn 
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projects. 
THE COURT: So when is this? 
MR. RUSSELL: The letter's dated April 27th. He 
says he was there April 24, met with Trust Guarantee Corp. 
THE COURT: So who writes this letter? 
MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Larson. 
THE COURT: So by April 27, 1995, Mr. Larson is 
seeking financing for two Holiday Inns? 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: He mentioned they're in Moab and Park 
City? 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: On April 28, the service agreement 
is signed between Four D Development and Mr. Larson. But 
the Normans are not in Four D Development, Four D is Page, 
Barney, and Lanto, they're builders and the managers, and 
the Normans are the people who put up the property. They 
don't know about this service agreement. 
THE COURT: So what is the service agreement? 
MR. RUSSELL: Service agreement is for Mr. Larson 
to get financing for two Holiday Inns, one in Moab and one 
in Park City. Now, what brings Larson directly into the 
picture is that this service agreement says that if he gets 
financing for the Moab project, he gets a 25 percent cut of 
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Then we see that Four D is attempting to acquire a 
franchise for Moab. And we even have --
THE COURT: By April '95? 
MR. RUSSELL: This is May, June, I don't know 
when they started. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: Even have a draft of it, it was 
supposed to be in Greg Page's name, or in Four D 
Development's name. And for whatever, for whatever reason 
they couldn't do it. But beginning in June of 1995, we 
start getting the letters going back and forth between 
Trust Guarantee, is the Arizona financial outfit, and 
Norman Larson. 
And what happened here, Your Honor, is that 
Larson and Arnold smelled big money, and so they got 
involved in a very serious, direct way. They didn't tell 
the Normans about it, but they did. And we have documents 
that the jury can disbelieve their eyes if they want to or 
not. June 6th, a letter from Norman Larson, not Western 
Empire -- well, it's on Western Empire Advisors's 
letterhead. A letter from Norman Larson to Trust 
Guarantee. "We need a commitment very quickly so we can go 
ahead and pay for the franchise fee of $40,000. Mark 
Arnold, the attorney for the project, will be calling you. 
The borrower," that's them, "is prepared to place the 
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amount of $100,000 in a trust account." Well, they didn't 
have $100,000 in the trust account, nor were they prepared 
at the time to place it there. 
THE COURT: Can you tell whether they were 
proposing to do that from loan proceeds, or in advance of 
the loan? 
MR. RUSSELL: This is in advance of the loan. 
THE COURT: Well, is that what it says, it says 
in advance of loan we're prepared to --
MR. RUSSELL: No, it doesn't say that. It tries 
to give them the idea that they actually have this money, 
but they don't. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess I need to see that. It 
may be they're just saying we'll put $100,000 of loan 
proceeds in a trust account to make sure that it's 
disbursed properly. 
MR. RUSSELL: That is what it says, it says, "The 
borrower's prepared to place the amount of $100,000 in a 
trust account approved by borrower and lender until funds 
can be confirmed." That's what it says. They didn't have 
it then. 
THE COURT: Okay, funds can be confirmed, so you 
think until funds can be confirmed means in advance of 
getting loan approval? 
MR. RUSSELL: The loan funds they're talking 
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about, the $4 million that they're asking Trust Guarantee 
for can be confirmed. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: On or about June 16, Mark Arnold 
went to a client of his, Anne Young, and negotiated a 
$160,000 loan. Terms of the loan were for 90 days at 18 
percent interest; ten points or $16,000 paid to the loan 
fees; two points to Anne Young. And the loan was to be 
secured by --
THE COURT: Hang on, ten points to whom? 
MR. RUSSELL: Arnold and Larson. 
THE COURT: Two points to Anne Young. 
MR. RUSSELL: Two points to Anne Young, $3,200. 
To be secured by Norman's property. This was before 
anybody ever talked to the Normans about that. And they 
got the money on June 17, and it was deposited first in the 
American Legal Title, of which Mr. Arnold was the 
principal, and the check was endorsed by him. And then 
immediately made payable to Mr. Larson's account, all 
$160,000. And on June 16 — it was deposited on June the 
19th. 
June 16th, Mr. Larson writes Trust Guarantee, he 
says, "Please be advised that Western Empire Advisors has 
$100,000 in their trust account," which is the 100,000 the 
trust guaranteed. 
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THE 
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THE 
MR. 
faxed on June 
made. 
THE 
MR. 
apparently it 
COURT: What day was that letter written? 
RUSSELL: Pardon? 
COURT: When was it written? 
RUSSELL: It was written June 16. It was 1 
19th, which was the day that the deposit was 
COURT: Okay. 
RUSSELL: On the very same day, and J 
was walked down there, because it was filed 
on the very same day, Venture Properties Two, LC, is 
formed. Venti 
Larson and Ma. 
THE 
MR. 
are Property Two, LC, consists of Norman 1 
rk Arnold only. 1 
COURT: What day is that? 
RUSSELL: June 19th. On June 20, Mark Arnold 
gets his $8,000 cut of the loan proceeds. On June 21st --
and to affirm the counsel, when I say Norman Larson, we'll 1 
use that interchangeably with Western Empire Advisors. 
June 21st, La. rson gets his $8,000 cut. Also on June 21st, 
a check from Western Empire Advisors. The deposition 
testimony is 1 
Arnold. Out < 
Morris and As. 
that this is handwriting of both Larson and J 
of the loan proceeds this $10,000 to Robert 
sociates is an earnest money for property in J 
Park City. Now, the Normans have no knowledge of the Park 
City project, no interest in the Park City project, and yet 
these loan funds that their property is securing is used 
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1 for that. 
2 THE COURT: Now, as it turns out, that earnest 
3 money came back and was put back in the account, right; is 
4 that true? 
5 MR. RUSSELL: Well, that's an interesting point. 
6 The earnest money, on July 25th we have a letter from Mr. 
7 Arnold to the real estate company saying, please give us an 
8 I extension on this purchase so that we can finish up this 
9 transaction. If you can't do that, then you better return 
10 the money to us. Well, somebody, I don't know who, but 
11 somebody told the company to send the check back, not to 
12 Western Empire Advisors, but to Venture Properties Two, 
13 which is what they did. And the endorsement on the check 
14 is both Arnold and Larson. That check was eventually 
15 deposited in one of Mr. Larson's accounts. The $10,000 
16 doesn't show up on his accounting though. So we don't know 
17 what happened with that $10,000. 
18 The point that I left out, for whatever reason 
19 Four D, or Lanto, or Page couldn't get the franchise so 
20 Norman Larson got the Holiday Inn franchise personally, 
21 individually, not Western Empire Advisors but Norman 
22 J Larson. 
23 THE COURT: Which franchise, for Park City or 
24 Moab? 
25 MR. RUSSELL: For Moab. 
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He did, he did. But see, they're 
people. (Inaudible) at Holiday Inn, 
see the note down there, Olympics in 2002, Park 
THE 
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MR. 
in December o: 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Okay. So did they get a Holiday Inn 
Park City also? 
RUSSELL: 
f 1994. 
COURT: 
RUSSELL 
That's the one that already existed 
Oh, that's right, okay. 
: So one of the first checks, if not 
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the first check out of the Young loan proceeds was $40,000 
to Larson, reimbursed for the Holiday Inn franchise. But 
he didn't transfer the Holiday Inn franchise to anyone, he 
kept it in his own name. It wasn't transferred for well 
over a year after that, and that was only when he was 
forced to do it. 
So I'm saying that's taking $40,000 and putting 
it in your pocket. I'm saying that's $10,000 on venture 
properties, and putting it in your pocket. Mr. Arnold got 
the loan from his client at rates that Joe Kingsley will 
testify is the most expensive loan he's ever seen in his 
life, bar none. 
THE COURT: The Young loan? 
MR. RUSSELL: The Young loan. 
THE COURT: What was the — I got the points, 12 
points, what was the interest rate? 
MR. RUSSELL: Eighteen percent. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: And they paid themselves $16,000 
off the top of that loan. Now, this is supposedly, 
supposedly all this money is needed for seed money so that 
they can get this financing, so they can get the franchise. 
Well, they got the franchise, and Larson has it 
individually. They've put $16,000 in their pocket and paid 
3,200 to Mr. Arnold's client, they've sent $10,000 to a 
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project that these guys have no knowledge or interest in, 
they've spent $70,000 before they even got their signature 
on the trust deed. And --
THE COURT: Well, of course, they had to pay 
$40,000 for a franchise fee, they had to set aside $100,000 
because they'd said they would. And then another $19,200 
in points, leaves them with $800 left, right? 
MR. RUSSELL: My point is this, well, we havenft 
even gotten there yet on the time line, but when Page and 
Barney came down, they said they came to the Normans and 
they said we need $40,000 for the franchise yesterday, we 
need it immediately. Once we have the franchise, once we 
have the property that you own, everything else --
everything is going to be easy. So we need to borrow that 
$40,000 in order to get the franchise. Well, they already 
had the franchise, Larson already had the franchise in his 
own name when they came down here and told them that. 
So if — so you need $40,000 for the franchise, 
that's fair, but having taken the money out of the loan 
proceeds, they should have gotten, or the group should have 
gotten the franchise, not Larson (inaudible). You see, 
here he — this is why he's in the group, and later he says 
he isn't, many times. But he's in, he's the franchise 
owner, and he's used those loan proceeds to pay for it. 
THE COURT: Well, what Mr. Lalli told me is that 
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Larson was the only guy that could get a franchise, that 
Holiday Inn would give a franchise to; is that true? 
MR. RUSSELL: I don't know. It doesn't make any 
difference to me. 
THE COURT: Well, there's not necessarily 
something sinister about it, is there, if there's 
somebody — if I wanted a Holiday Inn franchise, I doubt if 
I could just go to Holiday Inn and say, hey, I want to be a 
franchise, they would be much more comfortable with someone 
they already knew who they had dealt with and who had --
MR. RUSSELL: Greg Page already had a franchise 
in Park City. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. RUSSELL: Already had one. Larson didn't 
have one. But the point is, so why are they in the group? 
And here is one of the reasons he's in the group, he's a 
franchise holder, they're not going anywhere without him. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. RUSSELL: And he's paid himself for that. 
He's taken the $40,000 back for that. 
THE COURT: Well, isn't it right that the people 
who are going to get the franchise would pay for it? 
MR. RUSSELL: No, Mr. Larson paid himself, paid 
himself back the $40,000. 
THE COURT: Well, if I bought something for 
o r n u T P U C 
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$40,000 and you want it, is it so unreasonable that you pay 
me the $40,000 for it? 
MR. RUSSELL: But he kept it, it wouldn't be 
unreasonable if he gave it to us. 
THE COURT: Well, wasn't it understood that he 
was holding it for the joint venture? 
MR. RUSSELL: No, at least not by these folks. 
But anyway --
THE COURT: You mean, they gave the $40,000 and 
were never expecting to get the franchise? 
MR. RUSSELL: They did expect to get the 
franchise, they certainly did. 
THE COURT: Okay. So they did give $40,000 
expecting to get the franchise. What you're troubled about 
is that the conveyance of the franchise didn't occur until 
some later point. Do you have any evidence that Mr. Larson 
was ever intending to hold it from them and not to let them 
benefit from the franchise? 
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. But for present purposes, 
I'm not troubled by it, I'm saying, that's why — that's 
why he f s in. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: That's why he's in. They're saying 
he's not in this group, he doesn't have anything to do with 
the group. He's in deeper than anyone in the joint venture 
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to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab, he's the franchise 
holder. 
THE COURT: Okay. They're going to have to get 
it from him at some point if they're going to have a 
Holiday Inn, right? 
MR. RUSSELL: You see, Your Honor, he's already 
gotten himself in a position for a 25 percent equity cut in 
the project, and he's the owner of the franchise, so how 
can you say you're not in the group? How can you say 
you're not involved in this venture under those 
circumstances? 
THE COURT: Well, if Exxon gets a lease from the 
BLM and then wants to make a joint venture with somebody 
who already has a joint venture, they could either join in 
the joint venture, or they can make a joint venture, a new 
joint venture between the two of them, couldn't they? I 
mean, just because Mr. Larson is going to have a cut of the 
project doesn't mean he's a partner in the joint venture, 
it doesn't seem to me. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, maybe not yet, but remember 
this case is about the $160,000 that was lost and turned 
into 212,000, and the Normans paid all of it. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. RUSSELL: And should they bear the complete 
loss for that? 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. RUSSELL: Or should the people that were 
doing all these things? 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, go on. 
MR. RUSSELL: Now the 160,000, another reason — 
I mean I donft -- it doesn't matter to me whether you find 
that Larson and Arnold were members of the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture, I think they're liable anyway. 
The $160,000 was obtained by Mr. Arnold, he was compensated 
from Larson, generously compensated for it. He then gave 
all the money to Mr. Larson. Mr. Larson's testified, and I 
think it was indicated by Mr. Haskins, that Mr. Larson 
didn't spend any of that money without Mr. Arnold's 
approval, and all of it was spent. 
THE COURT: All of the what, the hundred — 
MR. RUSSELL: All of the $160,000 was spent. 
THE COURT: Well, I've seen where all but $800 
went. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, so far we haven't even signed 
the note yet, $70,000 is gone, and they don't have $100,000 
in the bank anymore. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm — they've got 
$100,000, they're supposed to put $100,000 in a trust 
account. But so far what I've heard is that they borrowed 
160,000, they've sent 16,000 to these people as finder's 
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fees, Arnold and Larson, and $3,200 to Anne Young for an 
origination fee. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And $40,000 to Larson to reimburse 
him for the cost of acquiring the franchise, for the 
franchise fee. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And then $100,000 had to be placed in 
a trust account, and I assume it was. 
MR. RUSSELL: All of it was in WEA's account. 
Whether itfs a trust account or not — 
THE COURT: It was held by WEA as promised to 
these banks. 
MR. RUSSELL: But it wasn't, because they also 
had sent $10,000 as earnest money on the Park City project. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: That takes you below $100,000 
already. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: And which that alone, Your Honor, 
we've got the report saying you give us $100,000 for the 
commitment fee, we'll give you your $4 million, that alone 
could be the reason that this whole project failed. 
Because they told them they were going to put $100,000 in a 
trust and they didn't. And they never could send it to the 
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lender, and they never 
THE COURT: 
they didnft eventually 
as far 
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havenft even really gotten to our theory of the case yet. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. RUSSELL: Then they come down and they get 
the Arnolds to sign the trust deed and note. The Arnolds 
do say that the note they signed was for $40,000. 
THE COURT: The Normans, you mean. 
MR. RUSSELL: The Normans. They have the trust 
deed. And the note is not payable by a joint venture or a 
partnership, itfs payable by individuals. 
THE COURT: Okay. And these individuals are 
mostly members of the joint venture, but Larson is a new 
name. 
MR. RUSSELL: Norman, Barney, Lanto, Page, and 
Larson. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: And we have evidence that there was 
some switching around of the note, because we have three 
different notes with three different dates, which is 
impossible to rationalize. But I don't think that we need 
to prove that, because the Normans found out that it was 
$160,000, even though they (inaudible) and talked to the 
people about it, they were convinced that, okay, they do 
need $160,000. 
THE COURT: So by the time they signed the 
Normans did know it was 160,000? 
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MR. RUSSELL: No, they signed a note that was for 
40,000. The note they got back said 160,000, they called 
up and said, what's this? And they said, well, we needed 
some more money for financing, and they were convinced that 
it was okay to do that. 
THE COURT: Did they keep a copy of this $40,000 
note? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: Nobody's ever seen it? 
MR. RUSSELL: No, of course not. Except for 
them. Well, except for them and the people that brought it 
down here, but it's gone. You know, you don't turn $40,000 
into 160,000 and then keep copies around. Well, maybe they 
have them, but we don't have all their documents. 
July and August go by, the letters continue to go 
back and forth between Larson and Western Empire, the 
money's here, we've got it, we need certain things. Trust 
Guarantee is, August 10th, prepared to activate the 
commitment for the Moab project. The commitment fee held 
by Western Empire Advisors can be wired to Trust Guarantee 
Corporation. We will immediately advise (inaudible) funds. 
Interesting letter, interesting fax from Trust 
Guarantee to Mr. Larson, (inaudible) million dollars 
available, this is September 22. "Enclosed letters are for 
your eyes. The clients cannot contact the company insofar 
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Honor. Mr. Larson was given $160,000 by Mr. Arnold, he put 
it in his bank account, it wasn't a trust account. Maybe 
it was a trust account, I don't know if it was or not. He 
put it in his bank account in which other funds were 
commingling, according to his own deposition testimony, and 
that tells you where all $160,000 went. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: There!s no income there. There's 
no interest that's added back into that account. The 
$10,000 refund that went first to Venture Properties Two is 
not added back into that account. Mr. Larson, when he got 
the $5,000 from Greg Page, I assume, put that into — I 
don't know where he put it. But when Greg Page was paid 
back, he took it out of that account. When Pete Lanto was 
paid $8,500 for who knows what, his contribution was to the 
Moab project, we haven't seen any. It was taken out of 
that account, and that's why they didn't have $100,000 in 
the trust account. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: In October, most of the money was 
gone, almost all of the money was gone. But Mr. Larson and 
Mr. Arnold still believed that they were going to get this 
big chunk of cash from Arizona. And it will be our case, 
and the -- and there will be evidence to support it, if it 
just gets in, that at that point Larson, Page, and Arnold 
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basically took over the joint venture. 
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MR. LALLI: Whatever is most convenient for the 
Court. 
MR. HASKINS: I would (inaudible) wait around, 
Your Honor, so we can complete it. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a five-minute 
recess, handle the noon calendar, then we'll come back 
here. And I might need to change clerks. 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: All right. We're back to Norman 
versus Arnold case 9807-116. And I think you were talking 
to me about what happened with the money. 
MR. RUSSELL: Uh-huh. I hope that that break 
didn't erase everything. 
THE COURT: It didn't erase everything. But I 
can't promise that it didn't erase anything. 
MR. RUSSELL: And I'm sure it's my fault, but I 
kind of have a feeling that I'm not really getting our 
message through very well. To boil down, it's simply what 
we're seeking to do here is simply hold these defendants 
responsible for their conduct that resulted in the Normans 
having to absorb by themselves this large loss. And the 
court wants to know why they should be held responsible for 
that, and we've gotten up to about October in the time 
line. $50,000 has been sent down to Trust Guarantee, 
that's a week after the fax that said, here is some 
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information, but you can't tell anybody about it because it 
will cause problems. I think any reasonable people would 
have been highly, very highly suspicious about sending 
$50,000 down to these people, and that they're responsible 
for doing so negligently. But it wasn't their money, so 
that didn't really matter in terms of the potential payoff, 
which was several millions of dollars. 
We're in October now, and we have a letter dated 
October the 19th, Norman Larson to Mark Arnold, talking 
about Mr. Ramsey, who has been up to Moab and looked at the 
property, has been to Park City and looked at that 
property. So things are looking pretty good. Mr. Ramsey 
has them convinced, I guess, that there's a good 
possibility that all this money he's going to get — 
THE COURT: Ramsey is who? 
MR. RUSSELL: He's one of the Arizona people. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Larson's telling Mr. Arnold, 
giving him a list of things that Mr. Ramsey is concerned 
about, so Mr. Arnold as counsel can take care of those 
concerns, and he subsequently did so, this is October 19. 
On October 20th, Ramsey Holman, Trust Guarantee, October 
20th letter from Norm Larson, now we're talking about three 
projects, there's one in Moab, there's one in Park City, 
there's one in Richfield. The Normans don't know anything 
95 
about the Richfield property either. We have issued 50,000 
in commitment fees, well, they know about that — well, 
they don't know about the 50,000, nobody talked to them 
about that either, but that's the 50,000 for the first five 
million, which will cover the construction of the Holiday 
Inn Express, and the purchase of the Park City land. Mr. 
Arnold, the attorney, has been very reluctant about 
releasing all commitment fees, since the commitment fee has 
been paid for the November closing, and because of the 
delays that have been incurred thus far in the process, 
also because they don't have 50,000 left anymore. And they 
still haven't paid the Youngs any interest yet. 
Nevertheless, as I say, they're thinking we have a good 
shot at this money. Same day — 
THE COURT: Who is thinking we have a good shot 
at this money? 
MR. RUSSELL: Arnold and Larson. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: Same day, this trust guarantee, 
it's an eight-page document that needs to be signed. It 
was dated October 4th for $3,131,000. This is what needs 
to be signed to make that commitment official. Norman 
Larson signs it individually on October 20, so the same day 
as the letter. So now what do we want him to do, we're 
going to have Arnold, Larson, Page basically taking over 
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the joint venture. As I said, the Normans are still in 
because it's their property, that's where it's going to be 
built, but they're beside the point. They've got the 
$160,000 from the loan because they were able to put up 
their property, and if something happens in Moab, fine, 
great. If something doesn't happen in Moab, well, guess 
who is going to eat it, the Normans. 
On October 25th, Pete Lanto's bought out on a 
Western Empire check purchase of entire interest of Holiday 
Express, it's Mr. Larson's memo. Then on October 27, we 
have the meeting in Mr. Arnold's office. And we have the 
fax that goes from Mark Arnold to Mr. Larson, the order of 
things is not entirely clear, but it doesn't matter. The 
first thing, or the first page in the fax -- I had this all 
just arranged beautifully for trial, but it's not working 
for the argument. The first page of the fax, Mark Arnold 
to Norman Larson, from Mark Arnold's office, that's his fax 
number, is a letter from Greg Page to Pete Lanto and Duane 
Barney. Remember, Page, Lanto, and Barney are Four D. 
This says, this letter's to inform you of discontinuing my 
association with Four D, therefore, dissolving Four D 
through the differences in approving the goals in 
partnership. Based on Pete Lanto's sale of the interest in 
the Holiday Inn Hotels, Four D partnership is hereby 
immediately dissolved. The sale, but this is very 
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interesting, Four D is now dissolved, but nobody tells the 
Normans about it. But the letter goes to Lanto and Barney, 
but Four D were the people that supposedly were in the 
partnership with the Normans that were going to build, 
operate, and manage the Holiday Inn. So what do we have 
now, Four Dfs out of the picture. 
THE COURT: As I remember, Four D was the 
partnership that already had — 
MR. RUSSELL: Four Dfs was the one — 
THE COURT: — the Park City franchise. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And some of those same people were 
involved with the Moab joint venture with the Normans, 
right? 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. And incidentally Four D 
never existed in terms of a separate entity that was 
registered in the state of Utah, never existed. Same day, 
same time, you've seen this already, Your Honor, the 
purchase agreement signed by Mark Arnold and Pete Lanto. 
Mr. Larson testified that Mark Arnold negotiated the sale, 
testified that it was 8,500, but Mark Arnold didn't really 
pay that 8,500, he was accepting that interest of Mr. Lanto 
in lieu of attorney's fees provided to the joint venture. 
Mr. Larson testified to that. Mr. Winkler will testify to 
that, as told by Mr. Arnold himself; Michael Hughes will 
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testify to that, as told by Mark Arnold himself. The 
Normans were told before May 1st by Pete Lanto, before May 
1st, 1996, Pete Lanto had some drawings that Mr. Norman had 
provided that he wanted to get back, or get copies of. He 
didn't know anything about this, because he got ahold of 
Mr. Lanto who said, by the way, Ifm not involved anymore, 
Mark Arnold purchased my interest. So we — 
THE COURT: So what you're saying is Norman 
Larson's company bought Lanto!s interest? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, it's listed, it was Empire 
Advisor's that's listed, and that's what it says on the 
paper, but I think it was purchased really by Mark Arnold. 
Mr. Larson testified himself that it was for attorney's 
fees. They're both on there, in any event. 
THE COURT: I'm just trying — somebody paid 
8,500, right? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, Western Empire, you saw the 
check. And then as all this happened, Western Empire 
doesn't pay for anything, Western Empire paid itself back 
on October the 31st the $8,500. So again, we have the 
money coming out of the loan proceeds going some place — 
that's not what the loan proceeds are for. Pete Lanto 
didn't contribute anything, he was being bought out for his 
interest in Park City. And that's why the dissolution of 
Four D doesn't matter, because Four D never existed. These 
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guys are taking over that project and this project. 
Also, Mark Arnold who drafted this, who was an 
attorney, indemnifies Pete Lanto from -- "harmless from any 
and all claims arising out of development of the above 
mentioned projects, including but not limited to tort 
claims." So October 27, the only people that really know 
what they've done are themselves, and possibly Greg Page. 
The Normans don't know anything about it, but they have — 
knowing that all of the money is basically gone, knowing 
that the Youngs still haven't been paid their interest, any 
interest, knowing that the term of the initial loan has 
come and gone without even an interest payment, are saying, 
we want in because we think this money's going to come. 
The other thing that happened on October 31st was 
the giving Greg Page full power of attorney for doing 
Barney, who went to prison. And this document was prepared 
by Mark Arnold and notarized by Mark Arnold. Once again, 
nobody telling the Normans anything about it. So here we 
have the group that's now Larson, Page, and Arnold who are 
the joint venture, the Normans are in because it's their 
land. On November 3rd after these transactions have taken 
place and they say, well, we bought it for the other 
partners. Well, Four D Development, the other partners, 
that was dissolved on the same day that the function 
interest was purchased, and Duane Barney went to prison. 
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On November 3rd, this is five days later or so, here is Mr. 
Arnold responding to Mr. Ramsey's concerns, the $160,000 
will be paid off in closing, that's the loan amount, and 
the other things are not important. 
Then the thing that I think is most important 
that we've gone over before, same date, "Norman Larson, 
Mark Arnold, the attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix 
with a check, and you can confirm a closing date for this 
project. And the purchase of the land in Park City. We 
are very anxious to proceed since we own an equity 
position, and I have the Holiday Inn franchise." Now, how 
can you say after that that they are not involved, and I 
don't mean you, how can they say after that they're not 
involved in the joint venture? They just said, they just 
told the world that they were. 
THE COURT: Well, the question is, what do the 
terms of the Youngs — what do these five things have to do 
with proving any of that; that's the issue? 
MR. RUSSELL: Everything. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: They were the ones that did all of 
it. 
THE COURT: Why do the terms of the Young loan 
prove that it's more or less likely that Arnold and Larson 
were in the partnership? 
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MR. RUSSELL: I don't know that it goes to that 
specifically, but it goes to the issue of why the joint 
venture failed. The terms were so far beyond what would be 
commercially normal with Mark Arnold dealing with — 
dealing to himself, with a client to another client. It 
took $20,000 off the top of the loan proceeds that were 
thereafter not available for the purpose of the project. 
And what the Normans will testify is that if they had known 
any of this, they would have said, we don!t want to do 
business -- we don't want to be in this, give us our 
property back. We're not going to do this with you. All 
of this happened without their knowledge and consent, and 
that's why they ended up losing the money. 
If they had been told on October 27 that the 
people that were going to build, and operate, and manage 
the hotel, Four D, is now dissolved, who is going to build 
that? The only thing that they had in mind was, there's 
going to be a payoff, and once we have all this money, then 
we'll figure out what to do with it. 
It doesn't stop there though. Larson and Arnold 
figured out at some point that the people in Arizona were 
crooks, that the money was probably gone. 
THE COURT: The 50,000. 
MR. RUSSELL: The 50,000. So and I'm not sure 
exactly when that was, but just as pretty good proof of 
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what I just said, in January 1996, they're talking about 
the same outfit that has the 50,000. 
THE COURT: We used to be Trust Guarantee. 
MR. RUSSELL: It's the same one, itfs the same 
thing. Mr. Larson testified that they1re basically the 
same. Look at who the guarantors on the loan are now, 
Larson, Page, and Arnold, and this was to send down their 
financial statements and tax returns. Then --
THE COURT: Well, at least that's what National 
Acceptance wanted, right? 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. Right. The point is, Your 
Honor, we're not privy to all the conversations that 
they're having there, but it's pretty clear, it's pretty 
clear. I mean, the jury can infer from these documents 
what was happening, then they go --
THE COURT: The problem I think that Mr. Lalli 
keeps highlighting for me, and it's a problem that I see 
with this, is you don't simply come into court and say, I 
want to tell you everything that happened and now you tell 
me what should be done. That isn't the way it works. You 
have to plead a legal theory, and it has to be a legal 
theory that is accepted, or at least that you have a chance 
of persuading someone should be accepted as an extension of 
existing law. And then you have to have facts that fit in 
line with that theory. 
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You don't get to come in — I suppose people can 
agree to just come in and lay their facts out on the table 
and say, okay, finder of fact, do what you think is just. 
But if there's anybody objecting to that, and I hear 
objections here, you can't do that, you have to have a 
legal theory that has been pled so that the other side is 
on notice well enough in advance of the trial to prepare 
and they know what it is, what the legal theory is, and 
they know what the elements of that theory is, what it is 
that has to be proved, so they can investigate all the 
facts on that, and they can depose your witnesses. And 
that's the struggle we're having here. 
You say it doesn't matter, or you say that it is 
necessary to go outside the pleadings and that the 
pleadings don't cover the case, but I am bound, if the 
other party is holding you to it, I'm bound to follow your 
last pleading. And I have to say, okay, what is your last 
pleading, and what is the evidence, and does the evidence 
fit with the last pleadings? If it doesn't, then no matter 
what case you might have had, if you'd pled it differently, 
you don't have the case that you pled. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, the Court dismissed the 
fiduciary duty claims as an attorney, fine, that's out. We 
have pled fiduciary duties as co-joint venturers, we don't 
even have to plead that, that's assumed, partners have 
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fiduciary duties for each other. Therefs also agency 
theories. And for them to suggest that they don't know 
what our case is about is just not even close. Because we 
took both of their depositions — 
THE COURT: But it doesn't even matter whether 
they do or don't know, if you haven't pled it, they don't 
have to read between the lines as to your pleadings. They 
have the right to be put on fair notice by the pleadings, 
not by the depositions, by the pleadings as to what your 
claims are. And Mr. Lalli is saying, look, all you have is 
a claim that you breached some obligation of the joint 
venture agreement, or that you have an obligation as a 
co-obligor under the note. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, don't they? I mean, all what 
they did doesn't count for any obligation that they had 
either to the joint venture or the Normans? What I'm 
saying is, very simply, they became part of the joint 
venture, they did it, they did it purposely, they did it 
secretly. The Normans found out about it, and they 
accepted that. They took this entire loan proceeds, we can 
look at all of the checks, the only people that had 
anything to do with all of this money are Larson and 
Arnold. And then when they saw the chance that it could be 
successful, they became members of the joint venture. 
I mean that -- there's certainly at least a 
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question of fact when you have the piece of paper that says 
that they bought into it. When they write a letter saying, 
I own an equity interest in both projects, or we own equity 
interest in both projects, and I own the franchise. 
THE COURT: Okay. The question today isn't 
whether or not there's a factual -- whether or not they may 
be members of the joint venture. I decided at our summary 
judgment hearing, there's enough of a factual dispute that 
Arnold might have become a member of the joint venture so 
that you can try to prove that. But the question today is, 
how do the terms -- how do the specific terms of the Young 
loan prove it one way or the other? If it had been 12 
percent instead of 18 percent, what would it prove? 
MR. RUSSELL: Those go to the breach of the joint 
venture agreement. What I'm saying is, is that they 
became, purposely became members of the joint venture 
knowing what they had done. 
THE COURT: The Young loan was in June of '95. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And Arnold did not become a member, 
if at all, until October of '95. 
MR. RUSSELL: October. 
THE COURT: So how could that prove anything? 
How could the fact that he did put the Normans in touch 
with a possible lender, and that the terms were very 
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generous for the lender, how does that prove that Arnold 
breached an agreement that was not even in effect at that 
time, even under the most generous readings of the facts? 
MP. RUSSELL: I!m saying that having voluntarily 
joined the venture he should be responsible for his prior 
conduct that affected it. 
THE COURT: Huh? 
MR. RUSSELL: He was willing — yeah. He was 
willing on October 27th. On November 3rd, if those guys 
gave him $3 million to say, yeah, I'll take that, I'll take 
full benefit of everything that's happened so far. But he 
shouldn't be held responsible for what he did before, that 
made it less likely for that to happen? 
THE COURT: He's responsible for things he did 
before the venture was created? 
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: So if you undertake a fiduciary duty 
for a lawyer for someone six months from now, you're 
responsible for the acts you do today that may affect that? 
MR. RUSSELL: No, but this joint venture existed 
when they did all those things. The joint venture for the 
Holiday Inn existed when he did all those things, and he 
was acting as its counsel. Then he was acting as its 
counsel, nobody denies that, everybody admits that. 
THE COURT: Okay. But I've already decided that 
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the counsel aspect of this is out. 
MR. RUSSELL: I know. That's why he should be 
responsible for it. He knew there was a venture, he knew 
he was acting on its behalf when he became a part of it. 
THE COURT: Ifm pretty clear on that one then, 
that's out. The terms at a time period that was six months 
before, under the most generous reading of the facts, Mr. 
Arnold was a member of the partnership, what he did six 
months before he became a member of the partnership isn't 
probative of either whether he was a member of the 
partnership, or whether he breached the terms. You can't 
breach an obligation you don't have yet. And he had no 
obligation as a partner in June of 1995. 
MR. RUSSELL: None? And you're saying that he 
could have taken that $160,000 and walked away with it? 
THE COURT: No, he may have had obligations as an 
attorney for the partnership, and the partnership could sue 
him for having run off with the money. 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: But he had no obligation as a partner 
to other partners in June of '95, because he wasn't a 
partner until, the earliest, October of '95. The same has 
to be true of the Park City thing that was in August of 
'95. 
MR. RUSSELL: We're not seeking to hold him 
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another client of Mr. Arnold. The Youngs were threatening 
to foreclose, which is why someone had to be procured to 
take that over before they did foreclose, that happened to 
be Mr. Winkler. It also happened to be that Mr. Winkler 
ended up with the Holiday Inn franchise based on Mr. 
Arnold1s efforts to get that extended. Mr. Winkler though 
was fair to the Arnold's, he reduced unilaterally the 
interest rate to ten percent, because he thought 18 percent 
was ridiculous. But no, sinister, no (inaudible). 
THE COURT: So Arnold didn't — you're not — the 
Normans are not claiming that Arnold went out and got 
Winkler to come and cheat them further than they'd already 
been cheated, so that he could gain further advantage? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RUSSELL: I think he has relevant 
information. I think that he will testify that Arnold told 
him that he bought into the partnership for -- in lieu of 
attorney's fees. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, they're not asking that 
the Winkler go out entirely, just the fact — they're just 
asking me to keep out the fact to keep out that Arnold and 
Winkler had a relationship, right, it's not relevant. 
Isn't that right, Mr. Lalli? 
MR. LALLI: Yeah, that is, Your Honor. And we 
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understood they're claims, they're talking about conflicts 
of interest and self dealing, which are the fiduciary duty 
kinds of issue that aren't relevant to the contract claims. 
There was some fiduciary stuff involved in Winkler, but I 
understand that that's no longer (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, even if there was a 
fiduciary duty there, were they harmed by what Winkler did? 
MR. RUSSELL: They weren't harmed by what Winkler 
did, but our position was that since they had gone through 
this process for so long, and were facing such a big loss, 
that maybe they would have gotten an opportunity to have 
the Holiday Inn franchise themselves, since that was the 
whole idea in the first place, but Mr. Arnold shopped it to 
other people. And I call that a conflict. 
THE COURT: Well, the existence of a conflict is 
different from the question of whether there's damage 
resulting from a conflict. Are they claiming that they 
could have got a better deal if he hadn't? It sounds to me 
like thank goodness Winkler came along, or they'd had 
really been screwed. 
MR. RUSSELL: It is in terms only of the note, 
true. 
THE COURT: Well, Winkler wasn't going to do it 
without the franchise; is that true or false? 
MR. RUSSELL: That's true. 
Ill 
MR. LALLI: The franchise expired, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the franchise ended up 
going anyway. No one has the franchise now. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Paul Norman's partner had 
the franchise at that point in time, Mr. Winkler had 
purchased it from the partnership. So what was the 
situation, Your Honor, is that it had expired. I, in a 
last stitch effort, I wrote a letter to the Holiday Inn 
Hotels that said you promised us you wouldn't cut us off 
for another 60 to 90 days. If you1re going to cut us off, 
we're going to sue you. So they wrote back and said, well, 
it's expired, we'll let you have it back if you extend 
$20,000 instead of 40,000 for it. And Greg Page, their 
partner, had it at that point in time, and they obviously 
had no money to buy it, so they're trying (inaudible) to 
see if they could save it. That's what happened. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: But the point being, Your Honor, is 
that the relationship, or the conflict of interest argument 
isn't relevant to the two contract claims in the complaint. 
It's difficult to conceive how — 
MR. RUSSELL: I don't disagree. 
THE COURT: But you think you have something 
besides two contract claims still? 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, I don't. 
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MR. LALLI: This is the amended complaint, which 
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was amended in November of 1999 after Mr. Larson's 
deposition was taken in February of f99, Mr. Arnold1s was 
taken in August of !99. 
THE COURT: It says f98, are you sure? 
MR. LALLI: It's an error, it's '99. 
MR. RUSSELL: It's '99. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: And the two claims that remain are 
the first two. 
THE COURT: All right. "Defendants breach the 
joint venture agreement by failing to secure the Holiday 
Inn franchise, by failing to otherwise develop, manage, and 
maintain the property that the plaintiffs had contributed 
to the joint venture. By failing to contribute 
consideration, expertise, or anything else by using it to 
secure 160,000, which was used for purposes unrelated to 
the joint venture, and by allowing people into the joint 
venture contrary to its provisions, and allowing them to 
exercise authority over the joint venture assets." 
And then the default of trust deed note is that 
they're jointly and severally liable to the co-makers, 
okay. 
MR. LALLI: Just to speak lowly for a minute, I 
think the problem here it's been pretty apparent to me, is 
that Mr. Russell has a practical problem in trying to find 
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duties and hold people responsible, when they're not really 
the partners here. The partners of the Normans are Greg 
Page, and Duane Barney, and Pete Lanto. These people went 
out and they hired professionals to help them, they hired 
Mr. Larson to help them get financing, and they hired Mr. 
Arnold - this is probably overstating it - they obtained 
his services with no payment on some legal issues, and Mr. 
Arnold went along with that. But it's a question of duty. 
And Mark Arnold's duty arose by law or by contract. And 
the only one of these we're dealing with here is by 
contract, because we have two contract claims. 
And as I understand the plaintiff's theory, it 
is, when they sold their property to Winkler ultimately in 
1998, 212,000 of the 420,000 sales proceeds went to Winkler 
in satisfaction of an obligation that Winkler, or the note 
that Winkler had obtained from the Youngs. And it's the 
$212,000, as I understand it, that they're seeking to 
recover claiming that Arnold breached the joint venture 
agreement, and claiming that he is jointly and severally 
liable on the promissory note. 
And I think, as the Court has appropriately 
indicated, that the terms of the Young loan, the Park City 
deal, the preparation of the note and deed of trust, or any 
alleged misrepresentations about what the amount of it was, 
how the money was spent and Arnold's relationship with 
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Winkler is not relevant to that. And the terms of the 
Young loan, as the Court indicated, it doesn't matter if 
it's 12 percent, or eight percent. It doesn't matter if 
the points are one point, or ten points. That doesn't help 
a juror decide whether or not Arnold became a partner, 
whether he breached a partnership agreement for the first 
claim. It doesn't, on the second claim, it doesn't help 
the jury decide whether or not there was a default on the 
promissory note. 
One of the logical fallacies that I think the 
plaintiffs are suffering from is they're talking about 
expenditure of loan proceeds, but it doesn't matter to 
their claims in their complaint how the money went out. 
Their claims are predicated on the fact that the Normans 
had to pay $212,000, that there was an obligation. They 
have not sued saying there was some kind of mismanagement 
of the partnership assets. They're saying, we have a 
promissory note and other people are partially obligated on 
that. They're saying we have a breach — or we have a 
partnership agreement, and Arnold became a partner, 
accepted the terms, became bound by the terms of that 
agreement and then breached it. But to know how the loan 
proceeds were spent doesn't help anybody figure out whether 
or not there was a breach of the partnership agreement, or 
a breach of the — or some sort of liability on the 
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promissory note. The fact that the money was spent, the 
fact that -- and I!m not even sure that matters. Ifm not 
even sure it matters that the money was spent. The Normans 
ended up with the obligation, and they're trying to shift 
or share the loss of that. And that's what this lawsuit is 
about. 
And on their first claim, to prove their first 
claim, they need to show, number one, Arnold became a 
partner. And by their own testimony that couldn't have 
been before May 1 of 1996, because they didn't even know 
about the Lanto purchase agreement until then. So assuming 
the most favorable interpretation of the evidence for the 
Normans, Arnold doesn't become a partner until May of 1996. 
And as the Court properly acknowledges, anything before 
that time can't be a basis for him breaching the 
partnership agreement. 
Even if they get over the hurdle of the consent, 
which they both testified they never consented, and even if 
they get over the hurdle of Arnold, did he consent to be 
bound by the terms of this partnership agreement, the 
timing issue precludes all of the expenditure of the money. 
It precludes the preparation of the note and deed of trust 
and how they might have -- whether or not Arnold made a 
misrepresentation about that. It precludes things about 
Park City, because prior to that time, he doesn't have a 
117 
duty, he doesn't have a duty to Bob and Diane Norman. And 
that is the big problem. The people with duties were the 
partners, Page, and Barney, and Lanto. 
And similarly with the promissory note, most 
favorable interpretation of the facts is that in October, 
Arnold steps into Lantofs shoes and becomes a co-obligor on 
the note. Well, that's not true, because that's not what 
the purchase agreement says. And even if the Court or the 
jury disbelieves Arnold's testimony on that point, that I 
was purchasing the interest for the other joint ventures, 
including the Normans, the jury can disregard that and 
believe that Arnold is liable under that note. It's an 
obligation that the Normans don't have standing to assert. 
They can still sue Lanto, which they've chosen not to do. 
But they can't bypass Lanto and sue Arnold. And with that 
claim you also have the timing problem. And as Mr. Russell 
indicated, by October, by the time Arnold signed that 
agreement, the money was spent. The money was gone. The 
Park City deal had been negotiated. The Young loan had 
been made and documented. And that's what we're trying — 
we're trying to preclude that evidence for the very reason 
that, I think, is evident from everything that's gone on 
this morning. 
What Mr. Russell would like to do, and he 
realizes that Page and Barney can't pay, so he can't really 
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pursue them in this lawsuit. The only people left standing 
are Mark Arnold and Norm Larson, and so what he wants to do 
is get a big handful of mud and to throw it against the 
wall and hope a jury being sympathetic sees something 
dirty, but there!s not a cause of action for bad acts. 
There are causes of action for breach of contract, which we 
have here. And this evidence doesn't — is not probative 
of any liability on either of those points, on either of 
those claims. 
THE COURT: All the money, youfre saying all the 
money was spent before May of '96? 
MR. LALLI: Absolutely before May of '96, yeah. 
Mr. Russell just said it was spent before October of '96 --
195, excuse me. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. LALLI: So the timing issue, I think, is the 
simplest, most straightforward way of precluding this 
evidence. But it doesn't have to rely on that. The 
evidence, even if timing weren't a problem, it's not 
probative of a breach of a partnership agreement, or of 
default on a promissory note. But I do think that the 
timing of it precludes the evidence that we're trying to 
knock out. And, you know, unfortunately from Mr. Russell's 
perspective, that may knock out a lot of the jury appeal of 
this case, but we're here to deal with the facts and the 
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law, and the law doesn't let him go to the jury without 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay. You know, it seems that there 
are some things that when you look at the whole picture are 
troublesome here. What -- Mr. Arnold is an attorney for 
this joint venture, right? 
MR. LALLI: Yes. 
THE COURT: That!s an undisputed fact; isnft it? 
MR. LALLI: It is an undisputed fact. I think 
that there!s a dispute about what was he doing as an 
attorney. I mean, the plaintiffs will attribute much more 
to Mr. Arnold than we think is (inaudible). I mean, he did 
do -- I mean he investigated water and sewer, he entered 
into some negotiations on behalf of the joint venture, but 
this is the key really, is that he was doing it for the 
joint venture. But this is a personal cause of action. 
THE COURT: He puts them in contact with another 
client, Anne Young, who makes a loan. 
MR. LALLI: Well, I think it's significant to 
know that the Normans, they entered the joint venture, they 
agreed to contribute their land, and they signed the note 
and deed of trust before they ever even met Mark Arnold. I 
mean, Mark Arnold was dealing with Norm Larson, and Greg 
Page, and Duane Barney who said, do you know anybody who 
can make a loan? And Mark Arnold goes out and he says, 
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yeah, I have some clients that will make a loan, here are 
the terms. And then Larson, and Page, and Barney, you 
know, they negotiate the terms of a loan, they take that 
document to the Normans - and Greg Page will testify that 
he read it to them twice - and the Normans signed it before 
they ever even met Mark Arnold. I mean, Mark Arnold wasn't 
instrumental in getting the Normans to sign that loan. I 
mean, he made an introduction. 
THE COURT: I thought Arnold and Larson came with 
Page and Barney in April of '95, Arnold presented as a 
lawyer, Larson as a financier, this is before the Young 
loan; isn't that right? At least that's what they said. 
MR. LALLI: I don't believe that's right, Your 
Honor. I don't believe that Mark Arnold met the Normans 
before they signed the note and deed of trust. At least, 
that's what the Normans testified in their depositions. 
MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, with regard to Larson 
in their testimony, in their depositions the Normans 
testified they didn't even know who Norm Larson was until 
April of 1996. When they come to Salt Lake to get an 
accounting of what happened to their $160,000, that's the 
first time they ever determined that Norm Larson had any 
involvement with this alleged partnership. And they admit 
they'd never had any contact or consultation with Norm 
Larson about any of the issues that they've raised with 
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point on the fact that Mark Arnold took $8,000 a year 
before the earliest time that the Normans can claim he 
became a partner. I don't see how that creates a breach of 
the partnership agreement. 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't, it doesn't. I'm 
just trying to get at what I think are the reasons why the 
Normans are upset here. One of the reasons they're upset 
is that they belonged to a joint venture that hires a 
lawyer, and the lawyer puts them in touch with another 
client to make a loan, and the lawyer ends up with five 
percent of the loan proceeds in his pocket, in his law 
firm's pocket. And they didn't know about it, maybe Page 
and Barney did know about it and said it's fine. And maybe 
it was reasonable for Mr. Arnold to rely simply on Page and 
Barney saying that it was okay. But that's -- you know, 
that's a problem when an attorney does that without 
disclosure to the people who need to know. 
MR. LALLI: Well, if he has a duty. I mean, a 
duty to disclose, of course, is predicated on a 
relationship. 
THE COURT: A duty to disclose to his 
partnership, he was an attorney for the joint venture. 
MR. LALLI: Right. And there's no evidence, 
there's not even a suggestion that Arnold didn't disclose 
to Page and Barney the terms of this loan. And besides 
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that, and you've got another timing problem, and at the 
time Arnold made the introduction of the Youngs to the 
joint venture, you know, he wasn't representing the joint 
venture at that time. I mean, the acts, the legal services 
he performed on behalf of the joint venture came after 
that. 
THE COURT: So according to your version of the 
facts, he became — he started representing this joint 
venture after he put them in touch with Anne Young? 
MR. LALLI: Right. 
THE COURT: Well, if that's not true, then you 
could understand why the Normans would be upset. 
MR. LALLI: I think that the Normans are upset 
because they trusted Page and Barney primarily, and they 
ended up losing money. And the problem here is that the 
people that they should be suing are bankrupt. And so 
after the fact, retroactively they're trying to manufacture 
duties, and through a good lawyer they're trying to 
manufacture duties that Arnold had, because he's not 
bankrupt, and that Norm Larson had because he's not 
bankrupt. They're trying to share some of this loss. And 
while we can be very sympathetic with them, that doesn't 
make my client liable for it. 
THE COURT: The other dispersement that's a 
concern is $10,000 with respect to the Park City franchise. 
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And that happened before Mr. Arnold was a member of the 
partnership, under the most generous reading of the facts. 
And I don't know whether he even had anything to do with 
that. I don't know whether they alleged that he had 
anything to do with that. 
MR. LALLI: What happened there, Your Honor, is 
Mark Arnold was asked by Greg Page and Duane Barney to 
negotiate a purchase of property in Park City. Unlike the 
situation in Moab, they didn't have the property up there. 
Page and Barney had dealt with the owner of the Park City 
property, they had an acrimonious relationship, and they 
felt if they had their lawyer negotiate the transaction, 
that they would be able to get a more favorable price, so 
that's what they did. They sent Mark Arnold up there, he 
negotiated a price, he paid $10,000 earnest money with the 
full knowledge and consent of Page and Barney, who told 
Arnold and led him to believe that the Normans would be 
involved in that Park City development. And Greg Page will 
testify to that, that he had every expectation that if the 
Park City development were completed, that the Normans 
would be participants in that. And Norm Larson wrote the 
check out of his account and Mark Arnold paid it over. 
When the deal fell through, they transferred the 
money, they paid a check back to Arnold, Arnold signed it 
back over to the trust account that Larson held. 
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document prepared by Mr. Larson, and, unfortunately, I 
haven't had the opportunity to depose him because of the 
discovery cutoff after I got involved. I don't know the 
answer to that question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: But I do know that the check was 
signed back over to that trust account. 
THE COURT: Then there's $50,000 that goes, 
apparently ended up going to these people in Arizona, and 
they never gave it back. 
MR. LALLI: That's right. I mean, the $50,000 
went to Arizona. But the payment of that money followed 
the same process as the payment of all the monies. 
THE COURT: That was done before October of '95, 
right? 
MR. LALLI: I don't believe that's right. It 
was, according to this accounting, the 50,000 went out 
September of '95. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LALLI: And, you know, more to the point on 
that payment, you know, that was for the purpose of 
obtaining a loan. Even under the Norman's theory, that was 
the purpose of this money, was to obtain a loan. You know, 
it wasn't Mark Arnold who lined up this connection. I 
don't see how he can be responsible for that $50,000. I 
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mean, if somebody breaks into my car and steals money out 
of it, Ifm not liable for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. And what about this $8,500 to 
Pete Lanto? The Arnold's are upset — they're upset about 
the $50,000 with the folks in Arizona because, I guess, 
they say, you should have known better than to send it to 
these guys. The money to buy out Pete Lantofs interest, 
they1re concerned about this, I think, from all the 
appearances of the documents and the transactions with 
Lanto, that $8,500 was so it would be purchased by Larson 
and Arnold, right? 
MR. LALLI: Well, and it seems to me that the 
important fact there is that if Larson and Arnold did not 
pay the $8,500, then they never got Lanto1s interest. 
THE COURT: Why should it come out of the loan 
proceeds? If Larson and Arnold want to buy an interest on 
their own behalf, why not use their own money, why are they 
calling it loan proceeds? 
MR. LALLI: Exactly. That's exactly our point, 
is that Larson and Arnold did not want to buy an interest 
in this. And that's why Mark Arnold's going to testify 
that the reason he did that was because there had been a 
falling out among, primarily, Mr. Larson and Lanto, and 
they wanted to negotiate a buyout of Lanto to get him out 
of the way, because he was causing problems. And they went 
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to Arnold, and one of the things attorneys do is negotiate, 
and that's what he did. 
THE COURT: So they didn't acquire any equity 
interest in this project by doing that, they were just 
acting for the joint venture in getting Lanto out; that!s 
your theory? 
MR. LALLI: Thatfs Mark Arnoldfs testimony, yes. 
THE COURT: Then how is it that he becomes an 
equity investor at all, how come he!s represented as being 
an equity investor when there's a letter written to 
somebody later on? 
MR. LALLI: Well, Mark Arnold didn't write that 
letter. I mean, Mark Arnold never said that he was a 
partner or an equity investor. He thought about it. 
THE COURT: Who did write that letter? 
MR. LALLI: It was Mr. Larson. 
THE COURT: All right. The rest of the money 
looks like it's for paying interest and fees, small fees 
for things. 
MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, (inaudible). Firstly, 
that agreement on the Lanto!s purchase was drafted by Mr. 
Arnold, and it does not state (inaudible) it was going to 
be Western Empire Advisors. All of these letters were to 
Western Empire Advisors. Western Empire Advisors is not a 
party to this action, they didn't get sued. And our 
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position is, these are all contract claims. I mean, all 
this is not relevant. He's claiming $50,000 
inappropriately done, that they were negligent with regard 
to their dispersement of that, based upon the fact that 
they should have known, or a reasonable person would have 
known. I don't think you can amend the pleadings at this 
point and start making negligence claims. There are only 
two claims in this case, and they're contract claims. 
They're claiming joint and several liability of 
the promissory note, even though that note was to the 
Youngs, not to them. And I don't understand that legal 
(inaudible). I'm even in this case later than Mr. Lalli. 
And secondly, they're claiming that for some reason they're 
all joint venturers, even though they agree, and it's 
acknowledged in their own testimony from their depositions, 
they can't meet the requirements of Utah law of that issue, 
they just can't. They agree that Mr. Larson was never, 
never a partner and/or a joint venturer. They have to show 
there was a joint proprietary interest in the subject 
matter; that there was a mutual right to control. They 
agree that they were the ones in control, or Mr. Page was 
in control. There was a right to share in the profits; and 
that there was an agreement and duty to share in the 
losses. And they agree in their own depositions, and Mr. 
Russell can't dispute this, on all those elements with 
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regard to Mr, Larson and Mr. Arnold up until May of 1996, 
there was no agreement. And if there was an agreement, it 
was only after May of 1996 with regard to Arnold. So our 
position is this evidence just isn!t relevant. 
THE COURT: Now, I have just one question for 
you, Mr. Russell. How — Ifm trying to keep it in my head 
long enough to put it out. If — it has to do with the 
question of standing that's raised by Mr. Lalli. Mr. — 
let's suppose that Mr. Arnold did agree to buy out Lantofs, 
and actually personally acquire that interest, and that he 
then -- and that he promised to indemnify Lanto for any 
obligations that he had, how do you respond to Mr. Lallifs 
claim that!s Lanto1s right to assert, not your clients1 
right to assert? 
MR. RUSSELL: That's right initially. My 
position with regard to the Normans is that they, in 
effect, paid off the entire note. Whether or not someone 
came to them with foreclosure papers or not, the note had 
now been outstanding for, by the time that Mr. Winkler 
bought their property, for in excess of three years. So I 
guess they could have waited for the rest of their lives 
until Winkler owned everything that they had, based only on 
interest. 
THE COURT: I'm not having a problem with that. 
That's a point that Mr. Lalli's raised, but I didn't buy 
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that. I think the Normans acted responsibly to make a 
deal, to cut their losses, and to get Winkler taken care 
of. And they didnft have to be foreclosed on to have a 
right for other members of the joint venture to share in 
the loss, if the joint venture agreement requires other 
people to share in the losses, and if those other people 
are, in fact, members of the joint venture. 
But he's saying, this is with respect to your 
theory that they are co-obligors on the promissory note, he 
says they diclnft sign the promissory note, and the only 
thing they did is they promised to indemnify Lanto if he 
should ever become liable. But he hasn't ever become -- he 
has never had to pay anything. If Lanto ever has to pay 
anything, he can sue them. And, in fact, he can maybe 
assign his right to sue them to somebody else, but that's 
never happened. So you don't have the right to sue him, 
asserting Lanto's right to indemnification; isn't that 
right? I mean, what legal theory is there for suing and 
asserting Lanto's right to indemnification? 
MR. RUSSELL: That they're beneficiaries of that. 
THE COURT: So you're asserting that it was a 
third-party beneficiary contract? 
MR. RUSSELL; I'm saying that these people are a 
third-party beneficiary of that indemnification agreement, 
which specifically mentions the note and also (inaudible) 
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liability. 
THE COURT: Okay. That seems to me, thatfs the 
thing that occurred to me it would have to be third-party 
beneficiary theory, but I know there's elements of that 
that may — 
MR. LALLI: Well, and if I can address that, Your 
Honor. First of all, you have to be an intended 
third-party beneficiary. 
THE COURT: That!s what I was going to ask. 
MR. LALLI: And certainly there's nothing in that 
one-page purchase agreement that suggests anybody's a 
third-party beneficiary. But more to the point, I mean, 
put yourself back at that time. At that time there's an 
obligation owed by Lanto to the Youngs. All right, if 
anybody is an intended third-party beneficiary, it's not 
the co-obligors, it's the obligee, it's Young. So even if 
you get over the hurdle that, which I don't think you can, 
that there is no evidence of any intended third-party 
beneficiary of that deal, you just can't get -- you can't 
get to the point where they also intended to be jointly and 
severally, or somehow otherwise liable to the co-obligors, 
I mean, it just doesn't work. 
THE COURT: Maybe that's not clinically to my 
decision anyway, because the theory on the note and trust 
deed — the only thing I have to decide right now is 
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whether these things are relevant to proving obligation 
under the note and trust deed. And none of these things 
prove that Mark Arnold either was a co-obligor, or that he 
assumed the responsibility of a co-obligor. And all of 
these things do relate to, with the exception of his 
relationship with Winkler, all these things relate to 
things that took place before the earliest possible day 
that Arnold could have become a partner, or a member of the 
joint venture. So Ifm going to grant the motion in limine. 
The reason I!m leaving out Winkler is I just 
think that's a distraction, and it doesn't seem there's a 
serious argument here that Winkler screwed over the 
Normans. In fact, Winkler treated them very fairly. And 
so regardless of what Mr. Arnold had an obligation or a 
duty to do under a contract, putting them in contact with 
Winkler actually worked to their benefit, and they're not 
complaining about what Winkler did. So that's just a 
distraction. It just consumes the jury's time 
unnecessarily. 
There is a real risk — with respect to the other 
items, there is a real risk that will get the jury confused 
with actions of Mr. Arnold that he took before he could 
conceivably have been a member of the joint venture, and/or 
before he conceivably agreed to indemnify a member of the 
joint venture. And so there's too great of a risk of 
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unfair prejudice to him from that evidence, even if itfs 
relevant. And I think it has very little, if any, 
relevance here. 
It sure has taken a long time to get to this 
point. What else do you have that you need me to resolve? 
MR. RUSSELL: I need a clarification, did the 
Court just rule that this purchase of the interest doesn't 
have any relevance to whether he became a (inaudible), the 
Lanto interest? 
THE COURT: No, I didn't. 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay, good. I have a couple things 
that I'd like to raise. One, I'd like to make the motion 
to be allowed to amend the pleadings. I'd like to assert, 
I mean, it never occurred to me to assert the Normans 
interest as to sue on behalf of the partnership, because 
it's been clear to us that the partnership didn't care 
about the Norman's interest. But if that's the way that 
they need to do it, then I'd like to have permission to do 
that now. Perhaps Mr. Daisy's failure to make a disclosure 
will give us the opportunity to get this before the Court 
in the correct way. 
I'd also like to ask rule 54(b) certification on 
the fiduciary duty, because I think that that will come 
back, and that will allow us the opportunity to only have 
to try this once instead of twice. 
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THE COURT: I wish I could give you 54(b) 
certification, but Ifm sure I can't. 
MR. RUSSELL: You can if you feel like it's in 
the interest of the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: It's not just that. 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: 54(b) says, "When more than one claim 
for relief is presented in an action, the Court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer 
than all of the claims of parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the Court that there is no just reason for I 
delay, and upon an expressed direction for the entry of 
judgment." It seems to me like there's some case on that 
that is persuading me that I can hardly do it where 
everything hasn't been resolved. Let's see, well, maybe I 
better not try to resolve that today. You probably ought 
to file a rule 54(b) motion and let the defendants respond. 
I actually would like to see that resolved, I 
because -- I want to be candid to all of you, I made the 
decision I did with respect to that breach of fiduciary 
duty as an attorney claim in an uncertain state as to which 
way I should go. And I was not knowing which way to go, 
thinking it was a close question, I granted the motion for 
summary judgment on this, that issue. Because I ultimately 
did not see how a lawyer can be expected to not just 
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MR. RUSSELL: Another clarification, if I may, 
Your Honor. Is it the Courtfs ruling that consent is 
necessary in order for someone to become a partner when the 
persons were seeking to be held responsible as a partner 
makes that consent impossible by not telling them what 
they've done? 
THE COURT: You mean, am I finding that there's 
an exception to the consent requirement where, since 
there's been no disclosure, no consent --
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: — could be given? Yeah, I'm finding 
that there is no such exception. It seems to me what you 
don't know can't hurt you in that case. 
MR. LALLI: Yeah. Until there's consent, you're 
not a partner. 
THE COURT: The one that was running the risk 
there, I guess, was Mr. — if you wanted to be a partner, 
was Mr. Arnold and Mr. Larson. They didn't ask for the 
consent, so they stood not to get what a partner would get. 
MR. LALLI: I don't know if you want me to 
respond to the motion to amend or --
THE COURT: That's also something that I'm — in 
fairness, I think you ought to get a chance to see in 
writing. He's not even put in writing what his complaint 
would say. 
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MR. LALLI: Okay. I think that we could also 
accomplish, Mr. Russell made three or four motions in 
limine, that the Court's time permits. 
THE COURT: Let's talk about them. 
MR. LALLI: I'd like to have a ruling on them. 
THE COURT: What are they? 
MR. RUSSELL: The primary one was the 
reinstatement (inaudible) claim. We've heard it said here 
today that what happened was that this partnership went out 
and hired professionals who did what they did. And --
well, the Court just ruled that they didn't come up with a 
partner, so that's out. But I think that they had duties, 
fiduciary duties as professionals and as agents, which 
would bring that back into play, that's one. 
THE COURT: Well, okay, if your theory is that 
they had responsibilities to the Normans individually, I 
think that's foreclosed by my ruling that Mr. Arnold and 
Mr. Larson — I guess, it's only Mr. Arnold, had a 
professional duty to the joint venture only. And that's 
the thing that you want to severally and see if you can get 
the Supreme Court to change my mind on. But you also want 
to reinstate that punitive damages theory on -- or the 
punitive damages claim on the theory that you can commit 
the tortious act of breaching your duty to a partner in 
their partnership; is that right? 
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THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, why is that not an 
exception to hearsay rule? 
MR. LALLI: Well, first of all, I think the 
official record exception applies primary to records in 
this case. The primarily reason for that, and we've put 
this in our papers in opposition to Mr. Russell's motion, 
that the fact that other defendants who were parties to 
this case and now have been dismissed are in bankruptcy, 
that's not something that can go to the jury. I mean, the 
jury can't be informed on why dismissed defendants are not 
here. There is a model Utah jury instruction on that very 
point. And, you know, aside from not being -- how is the 
fact that Page and Barney are in bankruptcy probative of 
whether Mr. Larson or Mr. Arnold breached either of these 
two contracts? It's not — obviously the intent for 
wanting to suggest that Page and Barney are in bankruptcy 
or to put that into evidence is so that the jury will say, 
okay, somebody has got to pay the Normans, it can't be the 
other two, so it's got to be these two. And that's exactly 
why we have this standard jury instruction that says, 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when there are other 
defendants who have been dismissed, you're not to consider 
why they're not here, you're only to look at these 
defendants and consider their liability on the claims. I 
can look it up. 
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THE COURT: So you're saying — he!s not asking 
to put it in for the purpose of proving that they1re in 
bankruptcy, he's asking to put it in for the purpose of 
proving that they were partners. That these folks — the 
bankrupt partners thought Arnold and Larson were partners, 
right? 
MR.. RUSSELL: That's right. And it also says 
co-obligors under the note, which is directly contrary to 
what they claim what the evidence -- and, you know, just 
backing up for a minute, all of the — all of what they did 
they say, well, we told Page and Barney. That was the 
method of communication, and the statute says that 
communication to one partner with authority is 
communication to all partners. And so if they did 
communicate these things to Page and Barney, then they did 
know. And they did continue -- and they did consent. I 
mean, you'd either have to take it one way or the other. 
And if they say that Page and Barney were the official 
conduits for official communications, and they made those, 
then it's knowledge of the partnership. And the 
partnership -- and it moved forward, and therefore, they 
had knowledge. And they would be deemed to have consented. 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, imputing knowledge of 
partners is a very different concept from giving consent. 
And this was an issue that we've briefed extensively in our 
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contract 
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udgment papers. And it's not (inaudible) of the 
that says that there has to be unanimous consent. 
lso a law, there's a statute on it, and there's 
Utah Supreme cases --
THE COURT: Well, we're off the subject of the 
limine. The question is if we have a hearsay 
that applies. 
MR. LALLI: Well, first of all, I've never seen 
the documents that Mr. Russell is talking about. I don't 
believe i t's true that Mark Arnold's identified as a 
partner on the bankruptcy documents. 
Barney's 
the point 
concerned 
you — yo 
official 
copies of 
MR. RUSSELL: (Inaudible) listed on Duane 
file as (inaudible), or his firm, at least. 
MR. LALLI: That's not being a partner. I 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
MR. LALLI: So I don't think it is probative of 
that Mr. Russell was saying, that the Court was 1 
about. 
THE COURT: Well, which specific exception are 
u say it's the business records exception, or the 
records. Official records is 8038. 
MR. RUSSELL: There's an exception of certified 
court documents. 
THE COURT: Well, certified copies is just a way 
of authenticating. But still if it's hearsay, it's still 
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hearsay. And if you1re offering anything in a court 
document for the truth of what's stated in the court 
document, you still have a hearsay problem that you have to 
get around. 
MR. RUSSELL: Greg Page lists Mark Arnold as a 
signer on note. 
THE COURT: Okay. So it's still hearsay. We 
don't have Greg Page here saying that, we have a court 
document saying that Greg Page said it. And Greg Page 
can't be cross-examined. 
MR. RUSSELL: He will be. 
MR. LALLI: He's been subpoenaed, Your Honor. 
And so it's also not the best evidence (inaudible). 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, if he's here, then I don't 
need it. 
THE COURT: You can probably get it from him. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
MR. LALLI: Well, but the point about bankruptcy, 
I mean, that is something that should not be gotten into. 
And, for example, I don't think it's fair to question Mr. 
Page whether or not he took out bankruptcy. 
THE COURT: Well, we can deal with that by — I 
think you're probably right about that. I can just deal 
with that by requiring that Mr. Russell before he asks any 
questions that would suggest bankruptcy, that we have a 
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about 
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that in a way that protects the jury from 
the bankruptcy. So just alert me when we get 
r and we'll have a conversation outside the 
of the jury. 
MR. RUSSELL: I also filed a notice of intent to 
use hearsay with regard to Mr. Lanto. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Okay. What's that about? 
RUSSELL: 803 — or 4 — 
COURT: The catch-all exception. 
RUSSELL: The catch-all exception. 
COURT: Is he unavailable? 
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MR. RUSSELL: Based on our records he is. And 
Mr. Lalli responded, I think, appropriately that he did in 
detail exactly what those efforts (inaudible), at least 
alluded to them. I can give you more detail. 
THE COURT: Well, the standard under 804, the 
unavailable declared is, "Whether the statement is offered 
as evidence and material fact, more probative on the point 
than any other evidence, which you can procure through 
reasonable efforts. And the general purposes of these 
rules in the interest of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence." 
MR. RUSSELL: So in this case, we have the 
transaction where the interest is acquired, and that's 
certainly going to be important. 
THE COURT: So did he make a statement to someone 
about that, or write a letter, what? 
MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Norman, he told Mr. Norman 
about it well before May 1st, by the way, f96. 
THE COURT: So before May 1, 1996, Lanto told 
Norman that he had sold out? 
MR. RUSSELL: That he had sold to Mark Arnold for 
attorneyfs fees. Mark Arnold also told Bob Norman in 
December of 1996, which you made a contemporaneous note of, 
that he was thinking about acquiring Mr. Lanto1s interest 
(inaudible). Mr. Norman was fine with that. 
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THE COURT: Okay. What is the — ordinarily when 
you're talking about the catch-all exception, we1re talking 
about something that is like another exception to the 
hearsay rule, but not quite. There's certain guarantees of 
trustworthiness about this that -- that's -- I forgot, I 
didn't read that part. "A statement not specifically 
covered by the usual exceptions, but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Ordinarily 
a hearsay statement to a party doesn't have equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, as, for 
example, a hearsay statement to a doctor, or to an official 
person, a government official, or to somebody who is right 
there on the scene, or that's made when you're really 
excited. I mean, what are the equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness? Was Mr. Lanto about to die? 
Was he — 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: Had he just been to speak with his 
priest about the importance of being honest? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. 
THE COURT: I'm not trying to be facetious, but 
we need something we can point to to say this is — people 
wouldn't lie in this situation. 
MR. RUSSELL: Well, I don't know if (inaudible) 
trying to start presuming that people won't lie. But Mr. 
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Norman simply contacted him. He didn!t know, again, about 
what had transpired, and he contacted him because he 
believed he was still in the partnership. All he wanted 
was some drawings back. There was no litigation, there was 
no threatened litigation. As far as anyone knew, the move 
was still on to get the funding and do the projects. And 
Mr. Lanto simply volunteered to him what his status was. 
THE COURT: Are you offering that for the purpose 
of proving that it was true, or just the purpose that it 
had been said? 
MR. RUSSELL: For the purpose that it had been 
said, and the Normans thereafter did not object. 
THE COURT: Well, you can have it for the purpose 
of showing that the Normans had notice. You can't have it 
for the purpose -- if there's some dispute about it. For 
example, if you want to introduce the statement to prove 
that there was some detail about Lantofs selling out that 
was — 
MR. RUSSELL: What I would introduce it for is 
that they had notice that Mr. Arnold had become their 
partner, and they didn!t object to it. 
THE COURT: Of course, there's a risk that the 
jury will use it for the other purpose, right? 
MR. LALLI: Well, what he said in his papers is 
that what he wants in is that Mr. Lanto informed Bob Norman 
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that Lanto had sold his interest in the joint venture, 
right? And what they're saying, I disagree with, but 
they're suggesting that selling your interest in a joint 
venture automatically makes you a partner without consent. 
Now, I disagree with that. 
And obviously the purpose, the purpose for 
introducing a statement Lantofs saying, I sold my interest 
is for that very — and for the truth. I mean, they're 
trying to demonstrate that, in fact, Lanto sold his 
interest. I don't see what else it could be for. 
THE COURT: Well, they don't need it for that, 
because they already have a document that shows that Lanto 
sold his interest. 
MR. LALLI: Exactly. I mean, if that's -- and 
they don't need the hearsay statement. 
THE COURT: They're — I think I believe that 
they just need it for the purpose of showing that Normans 
knew at that point. 
MR. RUSSELL: Right. 
THE COURT: So I think it's not hearsay at all 
because it's not offered for the truth. 
MR. LALLI: That the Normans knew what? 
THE COURT: That the Normans knew that Lanto sold 
his interest. 
MR. LALLI: Okay. Then that contradicts their 
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deposition testimony. 
THE COURT: True. And that's a problem that I'm 
sure the Normans are going to have with the jury is -- and 
that you'll point out. 
Mr. Russell, whether you decide to do anything 
about this or not is up to you, but I think I've said today 
that my understanding of the law about the obligation of 
co-obligors on a promissory note is that they have a right 
to seek contribution from one another, but not a right to 
sue as if they were in the position of the holder of the 
promissory note. And the claim you're asserting is that 
the claim that a holder of the promissory note would have, 
but the right of joint and several to collect jointly and 
severally from anyone. The beneficiary, the holder of the 
promissory note can collect from any one of five people 
that sign the promissory note, and doesn't have to care who 
signed it. Doesn't have to care who really was intended by 
all of these people as the one that would really pay it. 
If I co-sign a note for my son and he doesn't 
pay, the bank can come and make me pay. And they don't 
have to each prove that my son doesn't have any money, they 
can just collect from me. But if — but if my son doesn't 
pay and I end up paying, then I sue him on a different 
theory. I have to prove that it was intended that he would 
pay, and he failed to do so. It was his car, or whatever, 
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THE COURT: Is it really a question of what jury 
instructions should be given? 
MR. RUSSELL: No. And letfs see if I understand 
the Courtfs ruling just now, the Normans would not be able 
to ask the jury for an award of attorneyfs fees under the 
note, because that was an obligation that ran between the 
maker and the borrowers. I still think that the jury 
should be able to assess — 
THE COURT: But they may be able to ask for 
contribution for what they have to pay from other makers of 
the promissory note. 
MR. RUSSELL: And I still think itfs legitimate 
for the Normans to ask that 18 percent interest be the 
applicable rate, since that is the rate under the note, and 
the rate that they were subjected to, and eventually had to 
pay. In -- from the point of payment — 
THE COURT: So is all you want is to the extent I 
determine, or the jury determines that other people are 
responsible for all or a share of the promissory note, they 
should also be responsible for the pertinent interest, 
attorney's fees, and costs that were paid by the Normans? 
MR. RUSSELL: Correct. 
MR. LALLI: Your Honor, this is a promissory note 
between six co-obligors and the Youngs. And it has a 
standard provision that says, if there's a default, then 
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whatever we, the Youngs, spend in attorney's fees and 
trying to collect, we can recover those attorney's fees. 
They1re now trying to use that against their co-obligors. 
THE COURT: You mean, you want to recover not the 
attorney's fees that the Normans had to pay for Winkler, 
but the attorney's fees that they're having to pay to you. 
MR. RUSSELL: They didn't have to pay any 
attorney's fees to Winkler. 
MR. LALLI: They didn't pay attorney's, and they 
didn't pay 18 percent interest, they only paid ten. 
MR. RUSSELL: They paid 18 up until August of 
19 --
MR. LALLI: But that's all assumed in the 
$212,000. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, I think I'm pretty 
clear on that then. If the Normans ultimately are able to 
convince the jury that Larson or Arnold were obligated 
under the promissory note, or obligated as partners, and 
should share in what the Normans had to pay, the Normans 
can recover an appropriate share of what the Normans had to 
pay from these other partners or other makers of the 
promissory note, which would include the interest that the 
Normans had to pay. But it would not include the interest 
that they might have had to pay, but didn't have to pay; 
and it will not include attorney's fees they might have had 
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to pay, but didn't have to pay; and will not include the 
attorney's fees they incur in seeking the contribution from 
other partners or makers of the note. Clear? 
MR. LALLI: I think that's clear to me, Your 
Honor. But in the interest of clarity, I'm not sure I 
fully understood the Court's ruling on Mr. Russell's first 
motion to reinstitute punitive damages under different tort 
claims that are not in the complaint. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure I stated what my ruling 
was on that, but I didn't — I guess I'm going to deny it 
now. In case -- I think we may have moved on without 
actually expressly denying that. 
MR. LALLI: Do we have a new trial date? 
THE COURT: Well, I have four days in a row 
available in January and again in February. For some 
reason I've scheduled — I assume that Martin Luther King's 
birthday is going to be January 15th, celebrated January 
15th, so I think that's going to be a holiday. And also 
President's Day, February 19th, so those are the weeks that 
I have free, where I have a full week free, but 
unfortunately they're truncated by a holiday. Do you want 
me to go into March, and give you a full day? Or do you 
mind going over a weekend? Having a Tuesday through 
Friday, and then the next Monday trial. 
MR. LALLI: We would prefer not to do that, Your 
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Honor. We would prefer to do it straight through. 
MR. RUSSELL 
enough for five days, 
do it in four 
THE COURT: 
That!s fine. I don't think we have 
Your Honor. I think we can probably 
Okay. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I prefer January. 
THE COURT: 
January, run through 
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be stricken; is that 
THE 
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THE 
COURT: 
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: Your Honor, and I assume if the 
the 54(b) motion the trial date will 
correct? 
Right. 
Okay. 
On that subject, Mr. Russell, I just 
at the annotations under that, 1 
because my recollection is that there's some cases that 1 
require a real distinct separation between the different 
claims in order to certify under 54 (b). 1 
MR. 
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RUSSELL 
. They1 
entirely different ro 
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reading here, 
COURT: 
: I think you're right, but they are 
re coming at the defendants in an 1 
le. 
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"When the degree of factual overlap between J 
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facts 
on the same operative facts, or on the same operative 
with minor variations, they are not separate claims 
for purposes of subdivision (b)." So unless 
these facts pertain to this claim, and these 
to this claim and — 
Court 
MR. RUSSELL: If I understand what 
just made that ruling. 
THE COURT: It could be. I'm just 
way you'll need to lay it out for me to get a 
certiJ 
but I 
fication. I'm inclined to do it, I'd li 
'm not going to do it if I'm 75 percent 
Supreme Court's just going to send it back to 
there 
to do 
be up 
are cases where they indicate a certain 
that. If I think I'm punning something 
to them, they'll pun it right back in a 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: So that's the analysis 
be looking for in applying, is whether there 
sets of operative facts. Are we finally done 
time. 
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor 
MR. LALLI: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court's in recess. 
(The hearing was concluded.) 
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